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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA:
A RE-EVALUATION**

by

Boris M. Gershman

December 2010

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Kenneth Dombroski
Daniel Moran

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**PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA:
A RE-EVALUATION**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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(DEFENSE DECISION-MAKING)**

from the

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ABSTRACT

It has been nearly two decades since the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars of secession and subsequent deployment of peace operations into the region, and over that time numerous attempts have been made to assess the success of these missions. This thesis evaluates elements of these peace operations, which, although generally considered critical to their success, have been largely overlooked in these assessments. These include efforts to promote social well-being and combat organized crime in Bosnia, and the United Nations' preventive deployment to Macedonia. This study concludes that the peace mission in Bosnia promoted some aspects of social well-being, reduced the level of violent organized crime, and prevented a recurrence of violent conflict. However, its long-term success has been undermined by its inability to establish a truly unified, sovereign nation with an effective central government. In comparison, the preventive deployment to Macedonia has had a more positive long-term effect, promoting security and stable governance without undermining the state's independence.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Bosnia	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CRPC	Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees
DoD	Department of Defense
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force Althea
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
FM	Field Manual
HDZ	Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFOR	Implementation Force
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPTF	International Police Task Force
MSU	Multinational Specialized Unit
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NLA	National Liberation Army
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RS	Republika Srpska
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SNS	National Security Service
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSTR	Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
U.S.	United States
UN	United Nations
UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNPF-HQ	United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment, Macedonia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE

It has been nearly two decades since the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars of secession and subsequent deployment of peace operations into the region, and over that time numerous attempts have been made to evaluate the success of these missions and of post-Cold War peace operations in general. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate this literature to determine if there are elements of the peace operations that have not received adequate attention, and then analyze these elements to gain a better understanding of the effectiveness of these missions individually and as a whole. The findings from this study will then be reviewed and compared to better understand the long-term impact of these missions, identify any recurring themes and lessons, and determine if any of them have been applied in doctrine or practice.

This is an important subject for study because determining the long-term effectiveness of the Balkan peace operations can help clarify the current state of stability and security in a strategically located region with a proven ability to spark broader conflict. It may offer new perspectives on whether the states in the region are moving in the right direction and are on their way to becoming fully functioning, sovereign members of the international community, or if they are not making progress and, instead, sliding in the wrong direction and reverting back to weak, failing states. This is significant because weak and failing states pose a growing threat to the ever-more interconnected international community, undermining stability, security, the rule law, and economic development. Conclusions reached in analyzing these missions can also provide lessons for peace operations in other regions of the globe, especially those committed to the development of long-term, sustainable stability and security.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review analyzes a cross-section of interpretations and approaches to evaluating post-Cold War peace operations, with an emphasis on the missions in the Balkans, lessons learned, and U.S. involvement and national interests. It evaluates literature representing a comparative analysis, an institutionalist view, a realist perspective, and a functional critique. The selected works were chosen because they are considered some of the strongest representations of the different viewpoints in this field. The goal is to identify enduring themes, agreements, and differences, and any potential gaps in the literature that could benefit from further research and analysis.

1. Comparative Analysis

One of the more common methods of analyzing peace operations is the comparative approach, which provides a general overview and broad recommendations based on an evaluation of several case studies representing different regions and types of conflicts. Two of the seminal works representing this approach are *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*¹ and *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*,² both edited by Durch.³ The first work, a compilation of case studies of United Nations (UN) peace operations up through 1995, offers a number of observations by Durch, such as that the UN has overextended itself in a number of missions, including in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia), as a result of Security Council members turning to the UN to promote their political agendas and avoid unilateral action. He also takes the position that military forces are increasingly functioning as support and security for civilian agencies and objectives, yet coordination between military and civilian agencies and organizations (UN and non-UN) is lacking and structural deficiencies need to be

¹ William J. Durch, editor, *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

² William J. Durch, editor, *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006).

³ William J. Durch, senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center and former project director for the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.

addressed.⁴ From an American standpoint, Daalder⁵ points out that the U.S. has been more willing to be involved in peace operations in the post-Cold War environment, but has struggled with defining its role and commitment, especially from a military viewpoint.⁶

Several methods for evaluating peace operations are analyzed, including simply meeting the peace mission's objectives. Although this is a straightforward and useful criterion, it is difficult to apply in practice because the objectives of the host nation, contributing states, and members of the Security Council are often at odds and can shift as the situation on the ground changes. Durch tends to agree with Diehl's⁷ two basic criteria for evaluating peace operations,⁸ which include how well an operation deterred or prevented violent conflict and how effective it was at facilitating "resolution of the disagreements underlying the conflict."⁹ Based on Diehl's criteria most of the examples in the book would be considered overall failures, including Bosnia, which, although it eventually stopped the violence, did not resolve the underlying causes of the conflict.

Durch updated his work a decade later with *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*, which evaluates the types of peace operations most prevalent since the Cold War: those dealing with the aftermath of stalemated internal wars halted by external military force, with outcomes that do not satisfy any of the belligerents. These peace operations are carried out in high-risk environments with destroyed economies, ineffective governments, and deficient peace treaties. They are undertaken with insufficient knowledge of the conflict, limited resources, and unknown probabilities of

⁴ William J. Durch, "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons in the 1990s," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, 22.

⁵ Ivo H. Daalder, associate professor at the University of Maryland and director of research at the Center for International and Security Studies.

⁶ Ivo H. Daalder, "Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, 35–36, 60–61.

⁷ Paul F. Diehl, Henning Larsen Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

⁸ Durch, *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, 17.

⁹ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 34, 37.

success.¹⁰ Peace operations in the mid-1990s, such as those in the former Yugoslavia, proved especially difficult because they were carried out during active civil wars, the parties to the conflicts were not fully committed to making peace, and attempted peace negotiations had not been able to resolve the underlying causes of conflict.¹¹

Cousens and Harland's evaluation of post-Dayton Bosnia in Durch's *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* illustrates these points.¹² They believe the Dayton Accords were not implementable from the start because they were based more on compromise than the needs on the ground, stabilized lines of confrontation while simultaneously attempting to override ethnic divisions, and established a central government too weak to carry out necessary reforms. Furthermore, the belligerents were not truly ready to make peace. The subsequent peace operations were undermined by disagreements over relevant roles and responsibilities, especially between military and civilian components. The focus on early elections distracted international actors from addressing critical issues such as organized crime and a weak rule of law. The OHR was not initially strong enough to carry out its mandate, but its powers were then augmented to such a degree that Bosnian authorities were dissuaded from taking responsibility for developing and running their nation. Due to these deficiencies the vast resources expended on Bosnia have had disappointing results, illustrating how difficult it is to keep and build peace after the outbreak of civil war.¹³

In 2010 Diehl and Druckman¹⁴ reevaluated the effectiveness of the peace mission in Bosnia. They concluded that Dayton was successful at abating violence in Bosnia, which they consider to be the primary goal of peace missions. They support this claim by noting that Bosnia has not had an inter- or intra-state war, combat-related deaths, or

¹⁰ William J. Durch, with Tobias C. Berkman, "Restoring and Maintaining Peace: What We Know So Far," in *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*, 1–2.

¹¹ Ibid., 4–5.

¹² Elizabeth Cousens, vice president of the International Peace Academy; David Harland, director of change management in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

¹³ Elizabeth Cousens and David Harland, "Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina," in *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*, 118–122.

¹⁴ Daniel Druckman, professor of public and international affairs at George Mason University.

malicious peace operation deaths in the fifteen years since the Dayton Accords were signed.¹⁵ However, efforts to rebuild and reconfigure Bosnian society, lessen ethnic hostilities and suspicions, and resolve the sources of the conflict have proven far less effective. They conclude that one of the primary reasons is that although the Accords established a national government, Bosnia was partitioned into two semi-autonomous entities with essentially separate government systems and institutions. This led to a superficial reunification of the state, “more a veneer than reality.” An ineffective central government and ethnic partition have further undermined state-building efforts and prevented a long-term settlement of the conflict.¹⁶

2. Institutional View

Some authors take the position that establishing strong institutions is the critical factor in the success of peace operations. *The Quest for Viable Peace*¹⁷ reaches this conclusion and offers recommendations to achieving this objective based on lessons learned from peace operations in the Balkans. The editors and authors believe viable peace can only be achieved when the ability of domestic institutions to resolve conflict peacefully eclipses the power of obstructionist forces, marking a shift from imposed stability to self-sustaining peace. In order to attain this goal peace operations must transform the sources of violent conflict by recognizing, confronting, and overcoming the motivation and means for conducting actions in opposition to the peace process. Furthermore, international security can only be enhanced if initial military force is followed by a comprehensive effort to build a government and institutions capable of running their state in compliance with and in support of international norms. Achieving this goal requires establishing a system of governance based on nonviolent competition; demilitarizing or subordinating extra-governmental paramilitary forces to legitimate state

¹⁵ Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, *Evaluating Peace Operations* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 176–179.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 189–190.

¹⁷ Jock Covey et al., editors, *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2005).

authority; establishing a system of justice that serves the public (including minorities) and applies the law equitably; and creating functional, formal economies that provide the revenue required for the state to function.¹⁸

According to contributors Hawley and Skocz,¹⁹ the first step in achieving these goals is robust advanced political-military planning to harmonize the diverse military and civilian efforts into a comprehensive strategy for achieving viable peace. This is required in order to integrate political, security, rule-of-law, and economic lines of effort, address contentious policy issues to avoid policy gaps and disconnects on the ground, and motivate the international community to commit to a long-term mobilization of substantial amounts of personnel and resources required for successful stability operations.²⁰ Covey²¹ adds that a mission's success in achieving a viable peace will also be impacted by how effective the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), the custodian of the peace process, is at guiding the transformation of conflict between rivals in the postwar period. He must be able to overcome the tensions and shortcomings within the international community, bring civilian and military components together as a coherent team, and align all efforts of the mission with the "primacy of the peace process."²²

Regarding the rule of law, Hartz, Mercean, and Williamson²³ believe lessons learned in Bosnia and Kosovo emphasize that capacity building should be holistic, the mandate should provide adequate authority, international integration of effort is essential,

¹⁸ Richard H. Solomon, "Foreword," in *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation*, xi–xii.

¹⁹ Leonard R. Hawley, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; Dennis Skocz, former Director of the Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping at the U.S. State Department.

²⁰ Len Hawley and Dennis Skocz, "Advanced Political-Military Planning: Laying the Foundation for Achieving Viable Peace," in *The Quest for Viable Peace*, 37.

²¹ Jock Covey, former Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

²² Jock Covey, "The Custodian of the Peace Process," in *The Quest for Viable Peace*, 77.

²³ Halvor A. Hartz, former Police Commissioner of UNMIK; Laura Mercean, former UNMIK Department of Judicial Affairs lawyer; Clint Williamson, former trial attorney at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

end-dates are counterproductive, and capacity building should lead directly to local “ownership.”²⁴ These efforts should all be geared toward reducing the impunity of obstructionists and increasing the capacity of the legal system, because this will lead to a turning point in institutionalizing the rule of law and moving the conflict from imposed stability to viable and ultimately self-sustaining peace.²⁵ Blair, Eyre, Salome, and Wasserstrom²⁶ emphasize the importance of developing a legitimate political economy and addressing political-economic incentives for continued conflict. An integrated effort must be made to shift from a political economy of conflict, where economic transactions take place in the illicit marketplace, the state is captured by a criminalized elite sustained by illicit revenue, and social conflict is manipulated to “legitimize” the regime, to a political economy of self-sustaining peace where the formal economy supports the mass of society, which in turn pays taxes to the state and thereby provides resources back to society.²⁷

Dziedzic²⁸ and Hawley conclude that all of these strategies must be linked together to address the core sources of internal conflict, including war aims that remain unmet, militant extremism, lawless rule, and a criminalized political economy that fuels hostilities. Integrating mechanisms must be established to link together these interdependent lines of effort, including consensus top-down policy guidance, unified direction, and genuine civil-military partnerships, integrated executive leadership, a strategic mission plan, integration of military and policy operations, police and other rule-of-law activities, and political and economic strategies.²⁹ The necessity for integrating

²⁴ Halvor A. Hartz and Laura Mercean, with Clint Williamson, “Safeguarding a Viable Peace: Institutionalizing the Rule of Law,” in *The Quest for Viable Peace*, 162–163.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 167.

²⁶ Stephanie A. Blair, former UNMIK municipal administrator; Dana Eyre, former Senior Policy Advisor to the Deputy SRSG for UNMIK; Bernard Salome, former Head of the UN's Economic Policy Office in Kosovo; James Wasserstrom, Head of UNMIK's Office Overseeing Publicly Owned Enterprises.

²⁷ Stephanie A. Blair, Dana Eyre, Bernard Salome, and James Wasserstrom, “Forging a Viable Peace: Developing A Legitimate Political Economy,” in *The Quest for Viable Peace*, 207–209.

²⁸ Michael J. Dziedzic, former UNMIK strategic planner.

²⁹ Blair, Eyre, Salome, and Wasserstrom, *The Quest for Viable Peace*, 258–264.

the interdependent lines of effort is illustrated by the fact that relief operations often need protection from security forces, the military depends on the diplomatic process to provide a peace to keep, criminal-political power structures must be denied control of judicial processes, and demobilized soldiers need jobs to convince them not to return to armed violence.³⁰

3. Realist Perspective

There is a body of literature on peace operations that offers a realist perspective. For the Balkans, a prime example is Gibbs' *First Do No Harm*.³¹ Gibbs attempts to show that previous studies have misrepresented the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, and he takes a generally critical view of humanitarian intervention in the former Yugoslavia. He disagrees with the commonly held belief that Yugoslavia broke up and was engulfed by war due to internal factors, or that the international community, through its initial inaction, allowed major acts of genocide to occur. He also attempts to debunk the view that America was late to intervene because the conflict did not threaten its national interests, and that when the U.S. finally did become involved, it led to the resolution of the humanitarian crises in Bosnia.³²

According to Gibbs, most Western assessments of the Yugoslav wars overemphasized the importance of Serb aggression in order to justify military interventions focused almost entirely against the Serbs. His opinion is that other ethnic groups share at least as much of the blame for Yugoslavia's disintegration, as does Yugoslavia's financial crisis, which began in the late 1970s and was worsened by the meddling of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).³³ Gibbs believes that Croatian President Tudjman was just as racist and aggressive as Serbian President Milosevic, and the persecution of Serbs in Croatia was as brutal as atrocities committed by the Serbs. In

³⁰ Blair, Eyre, Salome, and Wasserstrom, *The Quest for Viable Peace*, 245.

³¹ David N. Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009).

³² *Ibid.*, 1–2.

³³ *Ibid.*, 46.

addition, stubborn Slovenian and Croatian self-interest motivated their secession, causing Yugoslavia's demise and leading to war. Furthermore, the structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF beginning in 1979 were focused on debt repayment and ignored their negative social and political consequences, creating the conditions that fueled ethnic hatreds and further promoted disintegration and violence.³⁴

Gibbs states that the U.S. originally allowed the European powers (primarily Germany) to handle the situation in Yugoslavia not because it was trying to avoid the role of the world's policeman and therefore gave Europe the opportunity to show that it could take care of its own affairs, but because it was preoccupied with Desert Storm and the breakup of the Soviet Union.³⁵ He also refutes the generally accepted position that Germany became involved only after the conflict broke out, and then only through diplomatic maneuvering. Gibbs states that Germany encouraged Croatian nationalists and prepared them for independence months before the war, and its recognition of Slovenia's independence in December 1991 and Croatia's in January 1992 terminated the existence of Yugoslavia and brought instability and violence to the region.

Germany's assertive actions and the dire consequences led the U.S. to reconsider its lack of involvement in the Balkans. The U.S. was concerned that Germany could become a dominant power in Europe and beyond, and that this would go against American interests and threaten U.S. hegemony.³⁶ The Bush administration decided to commit itself to the highly visible conflict in Bosnia and side with the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Bosnian President Izetbegovic's government. The U.S. then encouraged Izetbegovic to seek independence before a political settlement could be achieved, thereby guaranteeing the violence that followed. America did so to intentionally undermine the European Community's efforts at mediation and thereby maintain the major political and economic advantages from its hegemonic position in Europe. Despite objections from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. eventually had to turn to military intervention in order

³⁴ Gibbs, *First Do No Harm*, 75.

³⁵ Ibid., 76.

³⁶ Ibid., 105.

to support its Muslim clients and prevent a major loss of credibility. Gibbs' view is that these decisions could not have been based on humanitarian motives because it would have been far better, from a humanitarian standpoint, if the Western powers had instead tried to preserve the unity of the Yugoslav federation.³⁷

4. Functional Critique

Representing the body of work that provides a functional critique of how peace operations can be improved, Perito's *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?* takes this approach by evaluating operations in the Balkans.³⁸ Perito states that the War on Terrorism has made it critical for the U.S. to have the ability to effectively establish sustainable security in postconflict societies. The fact that Al Qaeda found sanctuary in countries like Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, and Bosnia supports the claim that unstable postconflict states pose a direct threat to U.S. national security. The U.S. must now intervene in unstable locations not traditionally considered vital to American national interests, and this requires the ability to project U.S. power in a way that quickly restores stability and creates an environment conducive to postconflict reconstruction and reconciliation. The U.S. can no longer afford to be unprepared for missions it does not desire, and needs new forces and a new approach to post-conflict intervention to effectively deal with rogue states and international terrorism. These modern peace operations require police activities such as investigating crimes and dealing with civil disturbances and urban violence, and military forces cannot and should not be made responsible for performing these functions.³⁹

Perito's answer to the problem of creating sustainable security in postconflict environments is a U.S. Stability Force comprised of a robust military component and effective civilian constabulary, policing, and law enforcement elements (lawyers, judges, corrections officers, etc.) to maintain public order and security. Such a force would help

³⁷ Gibbs, *First Do No Harm*, 138–139.

³⁸ Robert M. Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When we Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force* (Washington, D.C.: Unites States Institute of Peace Press, 2004).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 323–324.

prevent a security gap between the end of a conflict and the establishment of a democratic government capable of guaranteeing public order through the rule of law. It would do so by bringing together all the elements required for achieving sustainable security, providing a smooth transition from warfighting to institution building, establishing police and judicial authority from the outset, instituting the rule of law to create an environment hospitable to political, economic, and social reconstruction, and allowing for better interoperability with similar regional organizations. However, creating this force would require extensive congressional involvement, new authorizing legislation, and new funding. Furthermore, the Department of Defense (DoD) and Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose resources, influence and prestige would be vital to creating this force, would have to overcome their understandable reluctance to engage in stability operations. Most importantly, the White House would have to lead this effort and establish a “peacekeeping czar” on the National Security Council staff.⁴⁰

Perito puts the most weight on the rule of law because he considers it the foundation that facilitates an environment conducive to economic, political, and social development. His focus is on developing a competent police force and corrections system as well as an independent judicial system that works under the rule of law. Due to the importance of such institutions to post-conflict reconstruction, he emphasizes quickly establishing these capabilities with international forces and then transitioning to domestic institutions as soon as they can handle the responsibility. This is because a post-conflict society usually cannot produce institutions that meet the qualities of legitimacy, representativeness, and professionalism. The critiques that Perito points out in the conduct of modern peace operations are generally in line with most current literature on the subject and add more weight to the argument that post-conflict operations must focus on immediately establishing security and rule of law, doing a better job of coordinating

⁴⁰ Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When we Need Him?* 328–336.

military and civilian missions and actors, and actively supporting those in favor of the peace operation's mission while undermining spoilers opposed to the establishment of sustainable security.⁴¹

5. Evaluation

Comparing the schools of thought in this literature review reveals several recurring themes on peace operations in general and the Balkans and Bosnia in specific. The first is that modern post-Cold War peace operations, such as in the Balkans, must be prepared to operate in inhospitable environments and take responsibility for administering the state post-conflict. Second, stopping violent conflict is only the first step in peace operations; post-conflict stabilization, reconstruction, and reconciliation are equally important to furthering national, regional, and international security. Third, some form of long-term sustainable security should be the overriding objective of peace operations. Comprehensive security, a functioning legal economy, a legitimate and effective government, and the rule of law are all critical objectives towards achieving this goal. Fourth, the international community must make a long-term commitment to supporting peace operations and empowering and resourcing their missions so they can effectively carry out their mandates. Fifth, there must be an emphasis on building local partner capacity, as viable long-term peace cannot be achieved until domestic institutions are capable of independently running their state and peacefully resolving conflict. Finally, all aspects of peace operations must be harmonized to ensure they support each other and the ultimate goal of sustainable security.

There are also several areas in which the literature takes contrasting views. For example, although there is general agreement over the conditions required for establishing sustainable security, the authors tend to disagree over which conditions are most important. Perito takes the position that the rule of law facilitates all other end-states, while Gibbs focuses more on economics, and others favor security or government. Regarding the cause of violent conflict in the Balkans, Gibbs represents the contrarian

⁴¹ Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When we Need Him?* 3, 325, 337.

view that the catalyst was external, specifically the IMF's mismanagement of Yugoslavia's financial crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, while most others consider internal factors, such as ethnic tensions and disagreements over sovereignty, to be the primary causes of war. Furthermore, while the majority of authors believe peace operations have been instrumental in stopping and preventing bloodshed and working towards sustainable security in the former Yugoslavia, Gibbs' view is that international involvement has actually exacerbated the situation and undermined progress towards reconciliation and reconstruction.

In reviewing the literature, there appears to be several aspects of the peace operations in the Balkans that could benefit from further analysis. For example, although most of the literature emphasizes a number of objectives required to achieve long-term sustainable security, it largely glosses over the potentially critical goals associated with improving the population's social well-being. A number of the authors also stress the importance of promoting legality and legitimacy in all aspects of reconstruction and stabilization, however they barely touch on the role of organized crime in undermining these efforts. Finally, despite the fact that there are repeated references to the benefits of preemptively addressing potential causes of conflicts before they escalate to violence, there is minimal mention of the only example of such an operation, the UN Preventive Deployment to Macedonia (UNPREDEP). This thesis will attempt to address these shortfalls by evaluating the impact of the Dayton Accords on social well-being in Bosnia, the ability of peace operations to deal with Bosnian organized crime during and after the war, and the effectiveness of the UN preventive operation in Macedonia.

C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

This thesis uses two primary methods of analysis: the Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction found in the *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*,⁴² and a broader evaluation based on an operation's ability to accomplish its assigned mission and promote the development of its host nation. The Strategic

⁴² United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 8–10.

Framework was selected because it was developed by a collaboration between the United States Institute of Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute; it takes a comprehensive view of peace operations; it is current (published in 2009) and therefore takes into account the experiences and lessons of post-Cold War peace operations; and it is based on the first comprehensive set of shared principles for building sustainable peace, which is generally considered the overriding long-term goal of peace missions. This framework is based on five desired end-states, including social well-being, the rule of law, a sustainable economy, a safe and secure environment, and stable governance, and the conditions necessary to achieving these end states. Chapter III of this thesis uses this framework as its primary method of analysis for social well-being. Chapters IV and V will use applicable portions of the framework to provide a common reference point on organized crime and UNPREDEP for the findings in this thesis.

The sources used in this thesis cover a broad range of literature, from scholarly books and journals to first-hand accounts and memoirs regarding the wars and peace operations in the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) literature and statistical data, UN resolutions and Secretary General reports, status reports from the peace operations themselves, European Union (EU) progress reports, Congressional Research Service reports, military manuals and directives, and reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are all evaluated to provide a comprehensive analysis and viewpoint. The abundance of material on the subject was filtered to provide a spectrum of viewpoints of the most thorough and well-supported literature covering the entire timeframe from the outbreak of the Balkan conflicts to the current day.

II. BACKGROUND

In order to lay the foundation for these case studies, a background narrative is provided on the dissolution of Yugoslavia, associated wars of secession, and consequent deployment of international peace operations, with an emphasis on Bosnia, the central role of the U.S., and the formulation and implementation of the Dayton Accords.

When Warren Zimmermann, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, first visited its republican capitals in 1989, his message was clear: “Yugoslavia no longer enjoyed the geopolitical importance that the United States had given it during the Cold War.”⁴³ Formerly the model for a more politically and economically open style of communism, it had been surpassed by reforms in Hungary and Poland. Furthermore, human rights were playing a bigger role in American foreign policy, and Yugoslavia’s record was less than admirable. The U.S. would continue to support Yugoslavia’s independence, territorial integrity, and unity, but would “strongly oppose unity imposed or preserved by force.”⁴⁴ However, it soon became clear that Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Yugoslavia and later Serbia, was only interested in a unified Yugoslavia dominated by Serbs and planned to use the Yugoslav Army, whose officer corps was over half Serbian, to attain that goal. If Yugoslavia did break up, his alternate plan was to incorporate the Serbian majority regions into a “Greater Serbia.” This hardline approach did not sit well with the other republics, and only fueled separatist desires.

Zimmermann reported to Washington that Yugoslavia could not breakup peacefully due to the ethnic hatred being sown by Milosevic, and the ethnic diversity within the majority of the republics.⁴⁵ Yugoslavia’s disintegration would lead to extreme violence and possibly war, so he recommended supporting at least a loose unity accompanied by democratic development. President George H.W. Bush’s administration

⁴³ Warren Zimmermann, “The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December (1994): 2–3.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 5–6.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

also agreed with the European view that a unified Yugoslavia would set the right example for other nations breaking free from the former Soviet yolk.⁴⁶ America and most of Western Europe adopted this policy, and in June 1991 Secretary of State James Baker was dispatched to Belgrade to make it clear that America preferred for Yugoslavia to remain a unified state. He clarified however that Washington opposed any use of force, and that: “If you force the United States to choose between unity and democracy, we will always choose democracy.”⁴⁷ Although Zimmermann agreed with Baker’s message, he believed it came six months too late due to America’s earlier preoccupation with the Gulf War. Within weeks of Baker’s visit, Slovenia and Croatia had declared their independence, followed by Macedonia in September 1991, and Bosnia in March 1992.

As Zimmermann had predicted, the dissolution of Yugoslavia would rapidly devolve into a brutally violent conflict, which challenged the established role of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War international order. The UN became involved in the crisis in Yugoslavia in mid-1991, when Germany’s domination of European Council mediation efforts led France and Britain to push for UN involvement, where they had special status in the Security Council. On 25 September 1991 the Security Council voted unanimously under Chapter VII to impose an arms embargo on Yugoslavia and invited the Secretary General to offer his assistance to the ongoing negotiation efforts. The UN was seen as the right venue because it was considered to have the experience and resources for dealing with such a mission, whereas NATO’s military assets were designed for forceful intervention, not consensual peacekeeping.⁴⁸ By late 1991, the international policy towards Yugoslavia became a strategy of containment and indirect pressure aimed at bringing the parties to a settlement through an arms embargo, economic and political sanctions, and consensual field operations to alleviate civilian hardships. This was an odd midpoint between disengagement and forceful intervention, which was not considered a solution to the conflict but the least unacceptable of many poor options.

⁴⁶ Dana H. Allin, *NATO's Balkan Interventions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 16.

⁴⁷ Zimmermann, “The Last Ambassador,” 11.

⁴⁸ William J. Durch and James a Schear, “Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia,” in *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, 205.

In early 1992, the UN deployed its UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to Croatia, tasked by the Security Council to be an “interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.”⁴⁹ Although UNPROFOR’s primary mission was to protect the population with the support of the warring parties, a lack of cooperation meant that in reality UNPROFOR could do little to stop violence against civilians. The UN called for a return to normalcy through demilitarization, the return of displaced peoples, and restoration of law and order, but undermined its own plan by not giving UNPROFOR the authority to use force to achieve these aims. Once UNPROFOR realized it could not attain these objectives, it refocused its efforts on more realistic goals and was able to help sustain hundreds of thousands of refugees, protect small numbers of minorities, and temporarily prevent a larger conflict by helping maintain a fragile ceasefire.⁵⁰ However, UNPROFOR could not find a way to establish a durable political settlement in Croatia and after Sarajevo declared its independence in March the conflict quickly spread to Bosnia, only on an even larger scale.⁵¹

When UNPROFOR entered Bosnia in force in September 1992, its mission was not to monitor a ceasefire or impose peace, but to keep the population alive while diplomatic efforts to end the war continued. It had complex mandates that were often inconsistent, exceeded its resources, and did a better job of reconciling great power objectives than addressing the problems on the ground. Because Bosnia was an active conflict, it taxed the UN command, control, communications, and tactical intelligence structure to a far greater extent than any previous mission. Most importantly, UNPROFOR never gained the full support of either side of the conflict because the Bosnian government condemned it for failing to protect safe areas and the Serbs believed it was cooperating with the Bosniaks and Croats at their expense.⁵² Although UNPROFOR did an adequate job of providing humanitarian relief to over 2.2 million

⁴⁹ Durch and Schear, *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, 206.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 222.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 223.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 249.

civilians and overseeing the de-militarization of small stretches of the Muslim-Croat confrontation line, its primary impact was shifting the war from a quick Serb victory and bilateral division of Bosnia to a slow war of attrition that gave the Muslims and Croats time to balance and even exceed Serb military power.⁵³ By August 1995 the untenable position on the ground prompted UNPROFOR's major troop contributors to shift its stance from humanitarian intervention to peace enforcement and join NATO in forcing the Serbs to the negotiating table.

From the American standpoint, Bosnia presented the difficult question of whether, when, and how to intervene in other people's wars. Getting involved in Bosnia appeared to be a matter of choice rather than necessity, and the high level of complexity and brutality, coupled with the cost and uncertainty of success, weighed in favor of non-intervention. Baker famously summed up the administration's view by stating that America did not "have a dog in that fight."⁵⁴ Furthermore, Bush preferred that the Europeans and the UN handle the Bosnia situation without direct American intervention, allowing him to turn his attention to domestic issues in preparation for the upcoming elections. European leaders seemed confident and eager to resolve the conflict on their own, in part inspired by the post-Cold War resurgence of France's Gaullist vision of a powerful, self-sufficient Europe. However, Europe's attempts at an even-handed, non-accusatory approach paralyzed Western policy, as did the disagreement between the U.S., England, and France over the legitimacy and value of military action. These differing viewpoints sparked a strain in transatlantic relations reminiscent of the 1956 Suez Crisis, and appeared to be the first stages of a post-Cold War fissure between allies that no longer had a common existential threat.⁵⁵

By the summer of 1992, media coverage of the Bosnian War had accurately conveyed the grizzly nature of the conflict, and the American public was being exposed to stories of Bosniaks being murdered and driven from their homes as part of a Serbian

⁵³ Durch and Schear, *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, 252.

⁵⁴ Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 126.

⁵⁵ Allin, *NATO's Balkan Interventions*, 9–10, 15–16.

ethnic cleansing campaign aimed at seizing large swaths of Bosnian territory. There were even reports of concentration camps, invoking memories of Nazi death camps. The Bush administration's inaction became an easy target for the Clinton campaign, which promised that it would act forcefully to stop the conflict, even pledging American military, political, and economic power. Still, Vietnam-era liberals were not comfortable with the thought of a significant military commitment. Within the Bush administration, General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, publicly opposed military intervention in Bosnia and made direct comparisons to Vietnam, stating there were no clear military goals.⁵⁶ National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger also argued against intervention in Bosnia, believing the U.S. would be drawn into a political and military quagmire. There was a fear that American soldiers would become entangled in a costly war that would end in a humiliating defeat.⁵⁷

Once elected, Clinton realized the extent to which such action could incur national blood, treasure, and political capital. Having read Robert Kaplan's *Balkan Ghosts*.⁵⁸ Clinton apparently subscribed to Kaplan's view that the Bosnian conflict was caused by "ancient ethnic hatreds" that America could not hope to resolve, and was leery of committing himself to the crisis. In May 1993, Clinton sent Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Europe to look into a potential way ahead on the Bosnian issue. European allies were looking for American guidance and leadership, but instead received a Secretary of State who said he was only in "listening mode." The trip was therefore ineffectual and the administration made no progress towards establishing an American or transatlantic policy on Bosnia. Although the administration supported UN Security Council resolutions and NATO airstrikes to stop the violence, and worked on a peace

⁵⁶ Allin, *NATO's Balkan Interventions*, 16–17.

⁵⁷ Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*, 125–126.

⁵⁸ Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

settlement with its European allies, it was not enough to make a real difference. The Clinton administration's initial attempts at resolving the Bosnian conflict were ineffective.⁵⁹

The Bosnian War was seen by the Clinton administration as an obstacle to capitalizing on America's victory in the Cold War to promote the White House's goal of a stable, secure and democratic Europe united with the former Warsaw Pact members. The transatlantic alliance's inability to end the war, or even agree on a unified strategy, had undermined NATO and prevented it from being a crucial tool in achieving Clinton's vision for Europe. In November 1994, Clinton's top advisers recommended putting Bosnia on the backburner and focusing on strengthening the NATO alliance, but by early 1995, the administration realized that resolving the Bosnian conflict was integral to restoring NATO's unity and credibility.⁶⁰

In July 1995, Serbian forces overran the town of Srebrenica, a UN-declared "safe area," and killed over eight thousand Bosniak men and boys while the undermanned UN peacekeeping force stood aside. This was the largest-scale massacre seen in Europe since World War II, and it convinced the Clinton administration, which had done nothing to stop the genocide in Rwanda the year before, to take a leading role in ending the Bosnian conflict. The White House sponsored a NATO policy threatening increased airstrikes in retaliation for continued Serb aggression and did away with a debilitating "dual-key" process requiring UN approval of bombing targets. Serbs forces soon shelled a crowded Sarajevo marketplace and NATO followed through on its threat by launching a major air operation against the Serbs.⁶¹ The Srebrenica tragedy also galvanized American popular opinion for engagement in the Bosnian War and Congress consequently voted to lift an arms embargo against Bosnia with veto-proof majorities. This also motivated the White House to engage in a wholesale policy review on Bosnia, culminating in August with a more involved, forceful strategy based on shifting the military advantage away from the

⁵⁹ Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*, 126–127.

⁶⁰ Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 187.

⁶¹ Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*, 127–128.

Serbs by lifting the arms embargo, training and equipping the Bosniaks and Croats, and threatening major NATO airstrikes, while at the same time incentivizing a peace settlement by proposing to revise territorial boundaries and constitutional principles.⁶²

Yet, when the Clinton administration attempted to get buy-in from its European counterparts, the general consensus was that diplomatic efforts would fail. However, three ongoing developments significantly bolstered Clinton's policy. First, Operation Storm, the Croat-led, Bosniak-supported offensive had reduced Serb territorial control to less than fifty percent of Bosnia. Second, Milosevic declared he would be the Serb representative at any peace negotiations, sidelining the more hard-line Bosnian Serb leadership. Finally, NATO's air campaign exposed cracks in the Bosnian Serb military and proved that it was not invincible. This ultimately brought them to the negotiating table. In Washington, there were two primary interpretations of the new Bosnia policy. The popular view was that its purpose was to quickly end the conflict to ensure it was not a thorn in Clinton's side during the 1996 presidential elections. However those involved in the peace negotiation process, such as Richard Holbrooke,⁶³ believed the primary objective was to establish a secure, long-term peace within the framework of a unified, sovereign Bosnia. These divergent views would significantly impact the results of the November 1995 peace negotiations in Dayton, Ohio and the level of U.S. commitment to guaranteeing their implementation.⁶⁴

According to Holbrooke his team wanted to achieve as much as possible, including a lasting peace, and not back away from matters that would be difficult to achieve. However, the means for implementing these provisions were limited by powerful voices in Washington who were primarily concerned with quickly ending the violence in Bosnia. The result was a narrow mandate and one year deadline for NATO's military Implementation Force (IFOR), a severely constrained Office of the High Representative (OHR), no identified source of funding, and no plan for cross-agency

⁶² Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 164–170.

⁶³ Richard Holbrooke was appointed by President Clinton to lead the negotiation process at Dayton.

⁶⁴ Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 173.

coordination. All of these factors created an “enforcement gap” that would hamper the implementation of the Dayton Accords’ ambitious goals.⁶⁵ The saving grace for the Accords was that they were not etched in stone, allowing them to be modified over time to address their shortcomings and deal with developments on the ground.

After Clinton’s reelection in November 1996, he decided to extend the military mission for another eighteen months, but with a smaller troop presence renamed the Stabilization Force (SFOR). Its limited mandate remained unchanged, which was to enforce the Dayton Accords’ military stipulations and establish an environment secure enough to allow for Bosnia’s rebuilding. In his second term, Clinton revamped his senior staff, and Madeleine Albright, the new Secretary of State, believed the best way to achieve Dayton’s broad objectives was by expanding SFOR’s mandate to directly support civilian efforts focused on Bosnia’s long-term development. By May 1997, Albright had sold Clinton on her position on Bosnia, and the administration’s emphasis shifted from simply preventing another conflict to proactively supporting civilian missions such as arresting war criminals, protecting returning refugees, and demilitarizing and vetting local police forces. Furthermore, in December Clinton announced that a U.S. military force would remain in Bosnia until it had achieved sustainable security marked by a robust ceasefire, legitimate police force, and effective economic, political and judicial reforms.⁶⁶ In December 1997, the authority of the OHR was significantly augmented through the implementation of the “Bonn Powers,” which allowed the High Representative to remove obstructionists from the government, impose legislation that supported the goals of the reconstruction effort, and veto government decisions that he deemed counterproductive.

These measures helped make the peacebuilding mission more effective, allowing it to prevent a recurrence of large-scale violence and make some progress on post-conflict issues such as joint institutions, freedom of movement, minority returnees, electoral law, and the integration of the Bosnian police. The decade after Dayton saw no widespread

⁶⁵ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), 170–172, 205, 362.

⁶⁶ Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 177–178.

violence, the repair of much of Bosnia's infrastructure, the resettlement of approximately one million refugees, a number of alleged war criminals sent to the Hague (including Milosevic), and four rounds of relatively successful general elections. On the other hand, the results of ethnic cleansing had been consolidated, not reversed; Bosnia was not a viable, self-supporting state; state institutions worked poorly and were generally not trusted by the population; ethnic allegiances still transcended a national identity; and the economy depended on foreign aid, lagged behind the rest of the region, and remained heavily criminalized.⁶⁷ Today, fifteen years after the cessation of armed conflict, it would be worthwhile to reevaluate the legacy of the Dayton Accords . The following chapter will attempt to do so by assessing Dayton's impact on stabilization and reconstruction efforts to improve social well-being, a critical litmus test of a nation's post-conflict recovery.

⁶⁷ Cousens and Harland, *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*, 49–50.

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III. DAYTON'S IMPACT ON BOSNIA'S SOCIAL WELL-BEING

Although social well-being is regularly mentioned in literature on peace operations as an important objective on the road to attaining post-conflict sustainable security, it nevertheless tends to take a backseat to security, rule of law, governance, and economics. Much of the work evaluating peace operations in the Balkans is similarly lacking in this regard. This chapter attempts to partially fill this gap by studying how the implementation of the Dayton Accords has impacted Bosnia's social well-being. This will be done through an assessment of the Dayton-mandated peace operation's effectiveness at promoting social well-being as prescribed in *The Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, which defines social well-being as "an end state in which basic human needs are met and people are able to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement."⁶⁸ It is critical to attain this end state because without it social instability persists, stabilization and reconstruction efforts are undermined, and peace cannot be permanently sustained. This analysis will be based on an evaluation of the peace operation's ability to attain the conditions necessary to achieving social-well being in post-conflict Bosnia, which include access to and delivery of basic needs services and education, right of return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, and social reconstruction.⁶⁹

A. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS

1. Access To and Delivery of Basic Needs Services

Attaining the condition of access to and delivery of basic needs services means the population receives appropriate and quality assistance and has access to water, food shelter, and health services of sufficient quantity and quality to guarantee survival and the right to "life with dignity." The basic structure for obtaining such necessities is

⁶⁸ United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 162.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 163.

commonly destroyed or incapacitated during conflict or may never have been adequate, and therefore rebuilding the physical infrastructure is critical to enabling the long-term provision of these services. Ensuring access to these services is vital to the survival of post-conflict populations, maintaining livelihoods over the long term, and promoting the legitimacy of the state.⁷⁰

The international community has done an overall satisfactory job of rebuilding Bosnia's infrastructure since 1995, and the majority of the Bosnian population receives adequate assistance and has access to basic needs such as water, food, and at least rudimentary healthcare. Common indicators, such as infant mortality and life expectancy, support this position. According to the CIA World Fact Book, Bosnia currently has an infant mortality rate of 8.88 per 1000, which is on the higher end for Europe (the EU averages 5.61), but well below the world average of 44.13. Bosnia's life expectancy of 78.66 years is in line with the EU average of 78.82 and well above the world average of 66.12.⁷¹ These figures have improved from 11.6 and 75.47, respectively, at the end of the conflict in 1995.⁷² However, although mainstream society has access to basic services, there are portions of the Bosnian population whose needs are not being met. For example, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees (hereafter referred to jointly as displaced persons) face serious discrimination in access to healthcare, especially in areas where they are in the minority. Furthermore, although Bosnia signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the nation's fragmented legal and financial framework means the disabled often do not have access to health protection and assistance benefits.⁷³

⁷⁰ United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 164.

⁷¹ Central Intelligence Agency, *The CIA's World Fact Book 2010* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2010), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html> (accessed August 3, 2010).

⁷² Central Intelligence Agency, *The CIA's World Fact Book 1995* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2010), <http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact95/wf950032.htm> (accessed August 3, 2010).

⁷³ Commission of the European Communities, "Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 Progress Report," http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/ba_rapport_2009_en.pdf (accessed July 23, 2010), 18, 20.

Bosnia's public health policy has made little progress, especially in coordination between various ministries of health and international organizations. There has been no real strategic development, a roadmap drafted in 2008 has not yet been adopted, and a state-level strategic plan for health development is yet to be drafted. Furthermore, Bosnia's fragmented institutional and legislative framework has led to inadequate health insurance coverage and poor quality healthcare services, including nearly non-existent mental health services. Bosnia is supposed to be the home for a Regional Center for Cooperation in the field of mental health, but the center is yet to be operational. There is a state-level commission for adopting the World Health Organization's International Health Regulations, but actual implementation has been problematic. Similarly, although Bosnia has passed legislation to come more in line with EU requirements for health and safety at work, not all the cantons have adopted the relevant laws and minimal progress has been made at the entity level.⁷⁴ A lack of cooperation between levels of government continues to hinder the development of coordinated approaches.

2. Access To and Delivery of Education

Meeting the condition of access to and delivery of education means that there is system-wide development and reform to ensure equal access to quality and conflict-sensitive education. Ensuring the delivery of education during and after violent conflict is particularly important because it can help bring an end to and prevent the renewal of conflict by providing the population, children in particular, a source of stability and normalcy that can help them cope with conflict and its aftermath. Education can also promote cultural and moral changes that transform sources of conflict and encourage peaceful coexistence, further the development of human and social capital, develop a stronger national identity, and promote sustainable development and peace.⁷⁵

Bosnia has made some progress, at least on paper, in the realm of education. This includes improved coordination between the state, entity, and canton level; an agreement

⁷⁴ Commission of the European Communities, "Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 Progress Report," 41–43.

⁷⁵ United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 172–173.

to establish a Council for General Education and a common core curriculum for pre-school education; a standard rulebook for vocational schools; and a common early primary education textbook for Bosnian children living abroad. However, education institutions are generally understaffed and underfunded, the education system is not geared to meet the needs of the labor market, and quality assurance measures need to be improved. Furthermore, not all cantons have adopted a standard curriculum, little progress has been made on international statistical reporting requirements, and there is no national qualification framework. Framework laws for higher, pre-school, and vocational education have not been implemented due to a lack of consensus between the Republika Srpska⁷⁶ (RS) and Federation, preschool attendance at six percent is among the lowest in Europe, and displaced persons often do not have equal access to education.⁷⁷

Despite the seriousness of these issues, which have led some to consider Bosnia's educational system the worst in all of Europe,⁷⁸ the biggest obstacle to Bosnia's educational reform has been its inability to provide a uniform, quality education in ethnically diverse schools. Many Bosniak and Bosnian Croat students attend school together, but are separated in the classroom and taught different lessons on history, geography, religion and language.⁷⁹ The Federation has had minimal success in its attempts to restructure this "two schools under one roof" approach, which continues to create tensions at the community level. In addition, the continuous development of mono-ethnic schools in both entities has led to further divisions in the education system and de facto segregation from a young age.⁸⁰ The unique northeast district of Brcko is the only location where Bosniak, Serb, and Croat children are educated in the same

⁷⁶ Serbian Republic.

⁷⁷ Commission of the European Communities, "Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 Progress Report," 18, 20, 23, 43.

⁷⁸ Elizabeth Pond, *Endgame in the Balkans: Regime Change, European Style* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2006), 142.

⁷⁹ Craig Whitlock, "Old Troubles Threaten Again in Bosnia; 14 Years After War, Leaders Suggest U.S. Should Step In to Rewrite Treaty," *The Washington Post*, August 23, 2009, A.10.

⁸⁰ Commission of the European Communities, "Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 Progress Report," 18.

classes with an ethnic mix of teachers.⁸¹ This may offer a glimpse of what Bosnia's educational system could look like, but only with an immense level of direct international involvement and support that would be untenable for the nation as a whole.

3. Return and Resettlement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

Attaining the condition of the return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons means people displaced from their homes have the opportunity to voluntarily and safely return to their homes or resettle into new homes, have access to unbiased property dispute resolution, and receive reintegration and rehabilitation support to help rebuild their livelihoods and contribute to the long-term economic and political development and rebuilding of the host nation. Return and resettlement can promote the acceptance of an end to violent conflict, legitimize the new political order, and restore the society's orderly, pre-conflict lifestyle. Resolving nationality, residency, and property rights can also encourage a more effective, trustworthy, and durable relationship between citizens and the state.⁸²

The Dayton Accords paid a significant amount of attention to the return of displaced persons, with an entire annex (VII) dedicated to resolving this problem. One of the primary security concerns following the cessation of violence was for returnees. NATO bases such as Bratunac on the eastern border with Serbia were established in part to provide a sense of security for returnees. Freedom of movement, critical to facilitating the return of displaced persons, was vastly improved by the Accords and the OHR. Annex II established a border with no physical boundaries along entity lines, and empowered IFOR/SFOR to remove illegal barricades and checkpoints.⁸³ The Accords also promoted the return of real property, with a mandate in Annex VII leading to the creation of a Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees

⁸¹ Pond, *Endgame in the Balkans*, 143.

⁸² United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 178–179.

⁸³ Lejla Hadzic, "As Dayton Undergoes Proposals for Reform, the Status of Freedom of Movement, Refugee Returns, and War Crimes in Bosnia And Herzegovina," *Human Rights Review* 9 (2008): 142–143.

(CRPC). The CRPC built institutions for the implementation of property law, depoliticized the property-reclaiming process, and effectively drew on the resources of the international community to ensure that by the end of its mandate in 2003 more than ninety percent of property claims had been resolved.⁸⁴ These measures have led to the return of the vast majority of the over two million displaced persons uprooted by the war.⁸⁵

Despite these apparent successes there is another side to the refugee story, brought on in large part by the partition of Bosnia into two legally and ethnically divided entities. Although according to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) as of January 2010 there were only approximately 120,000 Bosnian displaced persons remaining,⁸⁶ this figure can be misleading because in reality many registered returnees only returned to their prewar homes to claim legal rights to their property, sell, rent, or lock their homes, and return to a region where their ethnic group is in the majority. There are several reasons for this, including the fact that those returning to areas where they are the minority have faced violence and persecution, and have generally not been well protected by the local authorities, including the police, who are composed of the local ethnic majority and often answer to nationalist politicians and elites. Furthermore, where discrimination laws exist they are generally not sufficient or fully applied, and the majority of discrimination cases are still pending. Ethnicity-based discrimination in employment, health services, and education is one of most serious obstacles to the return of displaced persons, without which long term return is not possible.⁸⁷

The returnee crisis is further highlighted by the fact that, according to Amnesty International, only 758 refugees and 216 IDPs actually returned to their pre-war Bosnian

⁸⁴ Hadzic, "As Dayton Undergoes Proposals for Reform," 146.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 143.

⁸⁶ United Nations High Commission for Refugees, "UNHCR Global Appeal Report 2010–2011: Bosnia and Herzegovina," <http://www.unhcr.org/4b02c8799.html> (accessed August 5, 2010).

⁸⁷ "As Dayton Undergoes Proposals for Reform, the Status of Freedom of Movement, Refugee Returns, and War Crimes in Bosnia And Herzegovina," 143, 145, 148.

homes in 2009.⁸⁸ Besides the reasons already mentioned, many do not return because they fear war criminals may still live in their pre-war communities and occupy positions of power. Furthermore, distribution of assistance to displaced persons lacks transparency and accountability, there is a lack of adequate housing, labor legislation and social security systems are fragmented between entities, and de-mining efforts have slowed due to a lack of funding.⁸⁹ There have been some efforts to address these issues by developing a more effective, country-wide strategy for supporting the return process and properly implementing Annex VII of the Accords. However, these revisions has been stalled in parliament over a disagreement between the Bosniaks, who want to commit more resources to returning displaced persons to their place of origin, and the Serbs, who prefer to divide resources between returning displaced persons to their place of origin and integrating them into the communities where they currently reside.⁹⁰

4. Social Reconstruction

The social reconstruction condition is advanced through inter- and intra-group reconciliation to address the remnants of violent conflict and community-based development to promote reconciliation and build societal links. This condition is met when the population has achieved tolerance and peaceful co-existence, accepted a national identity that outweighs individual, sectarian, and communal differences, developed the ability and will to peacefully resolve disputes, adopted community institutions that bring society closer together, and addressed the legacy of past abuses. Post-conflict societies may have a lack of cohesion, participants in and victims of violence who have difficulty reintegrating into the community, and a lack of formal and

⁸⁸ Amnesty International, *Amnesty International Report 2010: Bosnia and Herzegovina* (London: Amnesty International, 2010), 82–83, http://thereport.amnesty.org/sites/default/files/AIR2010_AZ_EN.pdf#page=27 (accessed July 30, 2010).

⁸⁹ Commission of the European Communities, *Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 Progress Report* (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2009), 20, 33, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/ba_rapport_2009_en.pdf (accessed July 23, 2010).

⁹⁰ Human Rights Watch, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Events of 2009,” <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87501> (accessed July 30, 2010).

informal local institutions. If these issues are not addressed through social reconstruction, individuals and communities may revert to violence to address unresolved grievances and disputes.⁹¹

The Dayton Accords did not establish a post-conflict environment conducive to pursuing social reconstruction. First, the Accords did not address a primary issue underlying the three-year conflict, whether Bosnia should be partitioned or reintegrated.⁹² Instead, the two largely autonomous entities and a weak state government promoted ethnic rivalry and partition, and did not give Sarajevo the power to effectively promote reconciliation and development programs. The complex governmental system and fragmented legislature that are a legacy of Dayton further hamper social dialogue.⁹³ Furthermore, the Accords did not address the right of individual citizens or assign a lead organization to deal with human rights issues, and did not make provisions for any ethnic groups besides Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats to be represented at the state level.⁹⁴ The following examples illustrate how these issues have stifled Bosnian efforts to promote social reconstruction.

At the state level, Bosnia has adopted a number of laws and conventions that, in theory, should help bolster the nation's efforts at social reconstruction. These include ratifying the 2005 UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, adopting anti-discrimination laws, including the primary elements of human rights law into the legal system, and implementing a legal framework aimed at minority protection. However, the one aspect these measures have in common is that the state government has been unable to successfully promote their implementation and enforcement at the entity level or below, resulting in a lack of minority protection, representation in politics and media, or

⁹¹ United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 186.

⁹² Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 159–161.

⁹³ Commission of the European Communities, “Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 Progress Report,” 13.

⁹⁴ Ruth Wedgwood, editor, *After Dayton: Lessons of the Bosnian Peace Process* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 42.

access to employment, especially in the regional public sectors.⁹⁵ Displaced persons returning to areas where they are the minority face discrimination in access to social rights and are prosecuted in far greater numbers for war crimes, further perpetuating ethnic divides and deterring social healing.⁹⁶

Worsening relations between ethnic groups have further promoted segregation, with Serbs dominating the RS, Bosniaks rarely venturing outside the Federation, and Croats increasingly leaving Bosnia altogether to resettle in Croatia. This is highlighted by a statement by the Roman Catholic bishop of Banja Luka, the de facto capital of the RS, that his predominantly Croat diocese has lost ninety percent of its prewar population.⁹⁷ Furthermore, Bosnia's practice of prohibiting anyone other than a Bosniak, Serb, or Croat from running for the federal Presidency or parliament violates international human rights law and continues to stifle inter-group relations. In June 2009 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Bosnia discriminated against two Bosnian citizens, a Roma and Jew, by barring them from standing for public office because of their ethnicity.⁹⁸ Another challenge has been the prosecution of war crimes, which has been unsatisfactory below the state level and undermined by nationalist politicians challenging official verdicts and convictions. All of this has led to a degradation of ethnic relations and recent gains for nationalist ethnic political parties,⁹⁹ further reducing the probability of significant social reconstruction in Bosnia's foreseeable future.

⁹⁵ Commission of the European Communities, "Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 Progress Report," 15, 19–20, 43.

⁹⁶ Amnesty International, "Amnesty International Report 2010: Bosnia and Herzegovina," 133–134.

⁹⁷ "Old Troubles Threaten Again in Bosnia; 14 Years After War, Leaders Suggest U.S. Should Step In to Rewrite Treaty," A10.

⁹⁸ Commission of the European Communities, "Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 Progress Report," 14.

⁹⁹ Amnesty International, "Amnesty International Report 2010: Bosnia and Herzegovina," 80.

B. EVALUATION

The Dayton Accords and the peace operations they authorized were successful in improving certain aspects of Bosnia's social well-being, especially those related to rapidly reestablishing the population's access to basic necessities immediately post-conflict. However, fundamental flaws in the Accords have simultaneously undermined the state government's ability to further improve the social well-being of its population. The significant power and autonomy given to the RS and Federation by the Accords at the expense of the state government has promoted the fragmentation of the state's institutions and legislature, and worsened coordination between all levels of government. This has reduced the ability of the state government in Sarajevo to govern over the entities and Bosnia as a whole, enforce laws promoting social well-being, and demonstrate to the international community that it is capable of implementing the social reforms necessary to make progress towards membership in NATO, the EU, and other regional and international organizations critical to its long-term development.

These governmental weaknesses have severely constrained the long-term development of Bosnia's social well-being. Displaced persons, ethnic minorities, and the disabled frequently do not have adequate access to basic needs and services, and minimal progress has been made in implementing work health and safety standards and reforming the healthcare system. The inability to provide access to and deliver uniform, quality education in ethnically diverse schools, exemplified by the "two schools under one roof" program, has led to an increase in mono-ethnic schools and further ethnic segregation. The return of displaced persons has been undermined by a fragmentation of labor legislation and social security systems between entities. Minorities face violence and discrimination that forces them to move to areas where they are in the majority. Subsequently, less than 1000 of 120,000 displaced persons returned home in 2009. Finally, the state government's inability to implement laws and conventions to promote social reconstruction at the entity level and below has undermined efforts to improve social dialogue and relations between ethnic groups, encouraging further segregation, the rise of nationalist ethnic parties, and political undermining of war crimes prosecution.

These issues indicate that Bosnia is not yet ready to take responsibility for its social well-being. The continued lack of a strong central government could further undermine ethnic reconciliation by preventing the adoption of universal, ethnically sensitive education; the implementation of laws ensuring minority rights and representation at all levels of government; and the promotion of tolerant, progress-minded politicians, while emboldening ethno-nationalist, extremist spoilers. The flaws of the Dayton Accords continue to undermine Bosnia's social well-being and the final resolution of the conflict that devastated the nation with war and stifle its progress towards becoming a truly stable, sovereign state. Ultimately, there can be no sustainable peace until the conditions for ensuring a population's social well-being are met. This requires parallel efforts to strengthen a fragile nation's security, governance, economy, and rule of law. One potential roadblock to these efforts is the illicit activity of organized crime. Therefore, it is critical to understand the role criminal networks play in conflict and post-conflict environments and their possible impact on peacemaking and stabilization efforts. The next chapter analyzes the relationship between organized crime and peace operations in Bosnia in order to further evaluate the international community's effectiveness at attaining its long-term objective of sustainable peace in the Balkans.

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IV. ORGANIZED CRIME AND PEACE OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA

Like the previous example with social well-being, a peace operation's ability to deal with organized crime is another critical aspect of attaining its ultimate goal of sustainable peace that does not receive significant analysis in the literature analyzing the effectiveness of peace operations. In order to help fill this gap, this chapter evaluates the association between organized crime and peace operations in Bosnia from the beginning of operations in 1992 to the present day. Attention is given to how the interaction progresses through conflict, post-conflict, and long-term recovery, driven by a changing environment and evolving interests and objectives. Both competing and, less commonly considered, symbiotic elements of the relationship are analyzed and illustrated through real-world examples. Efforts at dealing with organized crime are evaluated based on the outcomes of decisions and actions taken by those involved in the peace operations and their effect on the promotion of the rule of law and a sustainable economy in Bosnia using the conditions set forth in *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*.¹⁰⁰

A. WAR, 1992–1995

The Western Balkans have a tradition of organized crime, fueled by their location as a convenient smuggling corridor from Asia and the Middle East to Western Europe. President Tito's authoritarian regime held tight enough control over Yugoslavia to keep organized crime in check, but the economic downturn of the 1980s and the wars of the 1990s were a catalyst for its resurgence.¹⁰¹ During the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia, international sanctions and the constraints of war forced the leadership of all three ethnic groups to rely on organized crime to perform essential services¹⁰² and the smuggling and

¹⁰⁰ United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 63, 131.

¹⁰¹ Thomas Muehlmann, "EU Civil-Military Cooperation and the Fight against Organised Crime: Lessons to be learned from the Bosnian Example," *European Security* 17, no. 2–3 (June-September 2008): 388.

¹⁰² Robert M. Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When we Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004), 169.

trafficking of people, arms, drugs, timber, and fuel became entrenched in Bosnian politics and business. Due to the arms embargo, the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats turned to criminal networks for weapons and military equipment and Bosnian Serbs relied on smuggling and black marketing to fund their war effort. All sides relied on armed gangs and paramilitary groups like “Arkan’s Tigers” and the “White Eagles,” who were involved in illicit trafficking and other illegal activities.¹⁰³ These strengthened links between organized crime groups and government officials would prove to be a significant stumbling block to Bosnia’s postwar recovery.¹⁰⁴

This situation was further exacerbated by the fact that UNPROFOR was a peacekeeping force sent into Bosnia when there was no peace to keep and the unforgiving conditions on the ground promoted and enabled cooperation with a broad range of local war entrepreneurs and powerbrokers, including smugglers and semi-private criminal combatants. This illustrates the reality that peace operations can become deeply enmeshed in the illicit political economy of conflict in direct and indirect ways, often with a gamut of intentional and unexpected consequences. Peace operations in Bosnia contributed to illicit business activities and illicit business played a role in achieving a number of peace operation goals, including helping provide basic services to the civilian population and bringing an end to the conflict.¹⁰⁵

Peace operations can create a stable “business climate” favorable to illicit business, such as in besieged Sarajevo, where the UNPROFOR presence helped secure and stabilize the siege lines and airport, allowing them to become major smuggling points. Another example is the UN-protected “safe areas” such as Bihac and Srebrenica, which became stable enough for clandestine trading. The UN’s Sarajevo airlift and truck convoys for relief aid were unwittingly used to smuggle weapons, people, and currency, and were susceptible to bribery and “taxation” by the Serbs, with up to a quarter of the

¹⁰³ Ursula C. Schroeder and Cornelius Friesendorf, “State-building and organized crime: implementing the international law enforcement agenda in Bosnia,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 12, no. 2 (June 2009): 145.

¹⁰⁴ Steven Woehrel, *Congressional Rep. R40479: Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 10, 2010), 2.

¹⁰⁵ Peter Andreas, “Symbiosis Between Peace Operations and Illicit Business in Bosnia,” *International Peacekeeping* 16, no.1 (February 2009), 34.

aid ending up on the black market. Some UNPROFOR personnel even became directly involved, taking bribes, transporting illegal goods, and becoming paid informants, money couriers, brokers/intermediaries, and consumers (primarily of prostitution). Furthermore, UN economic sanctions and arms embargoes reduced supply and inflated prices, promoting cross-border black markets and closer ties between organized crime and the government, which became entrenched and persisted post-conflict. This is illustrated by the 1991 UN arms embargo, which caused a boom in illegal arms smuggling, and the 1992 economic sanctions enacted against the Milosevic regime, which severed formal regional trade but caused informal and criminal trade to fill the demand and flourish.¹⁰⁶

Although organized crime is usually seen as an obstacle to peace operations because it helps create and sustain the material basis for war and reduce incentives for peace, in some circumstances it can also help peace operations attain their objectives. For example, the UNHCR rarely met its supply goals for humanitarian aid in Bosnia, but it realized the black market's ability to help meet the population's basic needs, and therefore officially opposed but tolerated its operations. Bihac is a striking example. The city suffered under siege conditions throughout much of the war, and although the UNHCR was not able to provide enough aid to ensure the survival of the inhabitants, somehow the population endured. This was attributed to the locals' black market connections with their Serbian enemies and the main smuggling route that went directly through UN-protected areas and siege lines. Another example is that of "warlord" Fikret Abdic, who ran the Bihac region as his private fiefdom, signing trade agreements and charging "taxes" and transit fees on all sides. In November 1992, he made an informal agreement with the French UNPROFOR battalion, agreeing to facilitate their operations and provide land for a base camp in exchange for UNPROFOR escorting 400 tons of his smuggled goods per week. In 1993, only eleven percent of UNHCR aid arrived to Bihac, but Abdic moved three times that amount, 10,000 tons per month. Abdic made a valid

¹⁰⁶ Andreas, "Symbiosis Between Peace Operations and Illicit Business in Bosnia," 35–36.

point when he stated that “Everybody has accused me of war profiteering, but who else would have been able to bring these goods into Bihac? Who else would have been able to break the blockade?”¹⁰⁷

Illicit business can also help peace operations end a conflict, such as when arms smuggling shifts the military balance or breaks a stalemate, thereby creating the conditions for a negotiated peace. In 1995, Croat and Bosniak military offensives, strengthened in part by black market weapons in violation of the UN arms embargo, reclaimed substantial ground from the Serbs, shrinking their territory to less than fifty percent of Bosnia and thereby helping force them to the negotiating table. The arms smuggling networks that made this possible ranged in size from cottage industry to state-sponsored, and were even supported by the peace operations. Some UN peacekeepers, including the Turkish, Malaysian, Bangladeshi, and Maltese, are known to have smuggled in light arms, ammunition, and mortars. The UN depended on American intelligence to monitor arm smuggling activities, but the U.S. was increasingly opposed to the embargo and turned a blind eye, and by some accounts even informally facilitated arms smuggling to the Croats and Bosniaks. Part of the reason for this symbiotic relationship was that Bosnia’s highly criminalized war economy was generally not predatory or violent towards international actors, and therefore UN peace operations were often incorporated into it. However, the end of the conflict in late 1995 significantly altered the situation on the ground and marked a gradual shift in the relationship between peace operations and organized crime as each side adapted to the new environment.¹⁰⁸

B. POST-CONFLICT, 1995–2003

Initial post-conflict conditions, such as the legacies of criminalized war economies and the creation of convoluted state structures by the Dayton Accords, limited the effectiveness of counter-crime activities. War profiteer groups had “start-up funds” from their wartime activities that allowed them to continue many of their practices post-

¹⁰⁷ Andreas, “Symbiosis Between Peace Operations and Illicit Business in Bosnia,” 37–38.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 39–40.

conflict, including questionable privatization deals and reconstruction contracts. Post-war Bosnia was also overflowing with weapons and organized groups quickly began smuggling arms into neighboring countries and even EU member nations.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, corrupt, ultra-nationalist politicians who rose to power during the war continued to rely on these groups, who were now involved in organized crime syndicates, to retain their power and obstruct the implementation of the Dayton Accords.¹¹⁰ The Dayton Accords established a sophisticated ethnic power sharing model at the cost of effective and efficient state structures. Policing responsibilities were not assigned to the state level, but to the two governing entities, the Federation and the RS. While the RS had a fairly centralized system of government, the Federation's ten cantons all had independent police forces, creating a decentralized system not conducive to fighting organized crime.¹¹¹

The arrival of vast numbers of peace operations personnel, including IFOR's 60,000 soldiers, further contributed to the growth of organized crime in Bosnia by fueling the growth of brothels and sex trafficking. International personnel accounted for up to seventy percent of trafficking profits by the late 1990s.¹¹² The peace operations also helped create a more stable and secure environment for illicit business, illustrated by the so-called Arizona Market, which was formed near a headquarters for 4000 peace operations troops in the Spring of 1996. The U.S. Army actually provided \$40,000 of startup funds for the market to encourage entrepreneurship and cross-ethnic reconciliation and interaction. Instead, the market became a center for prostitution and for smuggling drugs, guns, stolen cars, and other goods.¹¹³ All of these factors allowed organized crime elements to play an increasingly pivotal role in Bosnia's power structure, and by the late 1990s, forty to sixty percent of Bosnia's economy was based on black-market

¹⁰⁹ Schroeder and Friesendorf, "State-building and organized crime," 141, 149.

¹¹⁰ Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When we Need Him?* 169.

¹¹¹ "EU Civil-Military Cooperation and the Fight against Organized Crime," 390.

¹¹² Schroeder and Friesendorf, "State-building and organized crime," 148.

¹¹³ Andreas, "Symbiosis Between Peace Operations and Illicit Business in Bosnia," 42.

commerce.¹¹⁴ Despite these developments, counter-crime efforts were largely neglected in the initial post-conflict peace process, not ranking highly on the agenda of international state-builders.¹¹⁵

In time, the international community began to realize that organized crime posed a greater threat to Bosnia's security and stability than the possibility of renewed military conflict, and that something had to be done before power was further consolidated outside the state's authority.¹¹⁶ However, Dayton's initially weak, limited mandate for the civilian mission meant that early on the OHR did not have the capacity to effectively coordinate international counter-crime efforts. This meant that the implementation of counter-crime policy in the early post-conflict years was the result of bargaining between international and domestic actors with divergent interests and was hindered by international mandates and activities that were often incoherent, lacked credibility with the Bosnian population, and did not adequately address Bosnia's security needs. Likewise, the UN's International Police Task Force's (IPTF) limited mandate meant that it did not have the resources or expertise to single-handedly confront Bosnia's organized crime problem and IFOR was initially reluctant to support the IPTF or engage in law enforcement activities due to its emphasis on force protection and a fear of "mission creep."¹¹⁷ After IFOR's mandate expired in late 1996, it was replaced with SFOR, but in its early period of deployment it also largely failed to support IPTF's efforts to fight organized crime.¹¹⁸

Despite SFOR's initial reservations about supporting policing actions, by the late 1990s it was becoming obvious that neither its civilian counterparts nor local law enforcement had the capacity to take on the threat crime groups posed to the peace mission and SFOR took advantage of its broad mandate to lend more support to anti-

¹¹⁴ Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When we Need Him?* 169.

¹¹⁵ Schroeder and Friesendorf, "State-building and organized crime," 141.

¹¹⁶ Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When we Need Him?* 170.

¹¹⁷ Schroeder and Friesendorf, "State-building and organized crime," 141, 146, 158.

¹¹⁸ Cornelius Friesendorf and Susan E. Penska, "Militarized Law Enforcement and Peace Operations: EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *International Peacekeeping* 15, no.5 (November 2008): 681.

organized crime operations. In 1998, NATO deployed constabulary-style Multinational Specialized Units (MSUs), made up primarily of Italian Carabinieri with a great deal of experience in dealing with organized crime. Although law enforcement was outside the MSUs' mandate, their ability to perform effective patrols, information collection, covert surveillance, and protective services would prove critical to SFOR's operations against organized crime.¹¹⁹ Still, as the following examples show, NATO's efforts would prove to be an uphill battle, in large part because of how entrenched these criminal activities had become in Bosnian society and politics and the level of support and protection this afforded them.

In January 1999, the local police of Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, with significant support from MSUs, arrested Jozo Peric, the local organized crime boss. Although the arrest temporarily disrupted criminal activities in the area, Peric was eventually released for lack of evidence because he had received advance warning of the arrest and was able to purge all incriminating documents. In October 1999, SFOR raided the Mostar headquarters of the National Security Service (SNS), a covert Bosnian-Croat intelligence agency, and confiscated equipment for producing forged credit and bank cards, a cache of illegal weapons and ammunition, and evidence that the SNS was carrying out intelligence operations to disrupt the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and implementation of the Dayton Accords. It was subsequently discovered that the SNS was carrying out financial crimes to fund these activities.¹²⁰

In the spring of 2001 OHR and SFOR pressure on organized crime and nationalist politicians in Croatian areas of Bosnia resulted in political revolt and violence against the international community. The ultra-nationalist Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union) party, or HDZ, declared they were withdrawing from the Federation and establishing Croat self-government in part of Herzegovina. To undermine the HDZ, SFOR attempted to seize and audit the accounts of Herzegovacka Bank, which was primarily controlled by senior members of HDZ with close ties to organized crime.

¹¹⁹ Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When we Need Him?* 170–171.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

The bank was a front for laundering profits from illegal trade in oil, cigarettes, liquor, and stolen vehicles, which the HDZ then used to promote their cause by paying off local police, politicians, and media. However SFOR's operations had been compromised, and audit teams and their MSU guards entering the bank's headquarters and branches were intimidated and attacked by armed mobs. Twenty-nine foreigners and Bosnians were injured, several seriously, and by the time heavily armed SFOR troops returned to the headquarters, all incriminating files and computer records had disappeared.¹²¹

The mixed results of these operations showed that it would take a more effective, unified strategy and better coordination between international military and civilian agencies and local law enforcement to successfully challenge local and regional organized crime groups, which were better integrated and more willing to set aside ethnic and ideological divides in pursuit of their goals.¹²² The overlapping jurisdictions of local and international administrations caused a constant shifting of responsibility between national and international judiciary and law enforcement agencies, and the numerous Bosnian police forces mistrusted each other and had no formally established methods of cooperation. These factors impeded the multi-disciplinary response and cooperation between institutions at the local, national and international levels required to curb organized crime. These flaws were underscored by a 2003 European Commission progress report stating that civil-military cooperation in the fight against organized crime in Bosnia was a major problem, allowing criminal activities such as customs fraud and smuggling to rob Bosnia's legitimate economy of approximately 150 to 300 million Euro per year, roughly equivalent to the annual state budget. However, with the EU about to take control of both the military and police components of the peace operation, there was hope that unified command would help correct these shortfalls and turn the tide against organized crime in Bosnia.¹²³

¹²¹ Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When we Need Him?* 173–174.

¹²² Muehlmann, "EU Civil-Military Cooperation and the Fight against Organized Crime," 388.

¹²³ Muehlmann, "EU Civil-Military Cooperation and the Fight against Organized Crime," 390–391.

C. EUPM/EUFOR AND BEYOND, 2003–PRESENT

In 2003, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) took over from the UN's IPTF and has since played a critical role in helping establish and support Bosnian law enforcement agencies.¹²⁴ In late 2004, EU Force Althea (EUFOR) took over from SFOR, and like SFOR, it has a broad mandate to support civilian peace operations, which it has used more forcefully to confront elements of organized crime. The fact that the EU now controls both the military and civilian international peacebuilding and reconstruction effort in Bosnia has made civil-military coordination in the effort to fight organized crime, after some initial growing pains, easier and more effective.¹²⁵ This intra-organizational environment has allowed EUFOR and EUPM to capitalize on each other's strengths and establish a unified front against organized crime. For example, MSUs, renamed Integrated Police Units, had their capabilities fully integrated with EUPM counter-crime efforts.¹²⁶ This effective transition also encouraged Bosnian law enforcement authorities to step up their efforts against organized crime, including enhancing the police's crime-fighting capabilities and better facilitating cooperation among the various crime-fighting actors, from the police to prosecutors to tax authorities.¹²⁷

EUFOR and the EUPM were able to pick up where SFOR and the IPTF left off, capitalize on their achievements, and take counter-crime efforts to the next level. Increased emphasis on confronting Bosnia's sex trafficking problem and a significant reduction in the number of international personnel involved with this activity considerably reduced human trafficking by 2005. NATO raids, the lifting of sanctions, and more effective border controls had already reduced arms smuggling, but the EU's better-coordinated operations were able to more effectively strangle this criminal industry, and by 2007/2008 arms smuggling in Bosnia was virtually eliminated. EUFOR

¹²⁴ Schroeder and Friesendorf, "State-building and organized crime," 147.

¹²⁵ Muehlmann, "EU Civil-Military Cooperation and the Fight against Organized Crime," 387–388.

¹²⁶ Schroeder and Friesendorf, "State-building and organized crime," 146, 153.

¹²⁷ Friesendorf and Penska, "Militarized Law Enforcement and Peace Operations," 690.

aerial surveillance of marijuana cultivation has also cut into Bosnia's drug trade.¹²⁸ These counter-crime efforts, as well as relative improvements in state-level institutions and economic and physical security, have significantly reduced the level of violent organized crime in Bosnia, actually making it less prevalent than in many Western European countries.¹²⁹ However, there is some indication that these measures have not dramatically reduced the presence of organized crime, but simply shifted it to other industries such as white-collar illicit business and vehicle theft and trafficking.¹³⁰

During the 1990s, activities associated with high levels of violence, such as the trafficking of people or weapons, were widespread in Bosnia. However, according to a 2008 report from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, "the Balkans are departing from an era when demagogues, secret police and thugs profited from sanctions busting and the smuggling of people, arms, cigarettes and drugs," with a swing from black economic activities to shadow and "white" entrepreneurship.¹³¹ Addressing these types of crimes will require a shift away from EUFOR/EUPM-style military-backed, forceful policing to more investigative, legalistic police work with local law enforcement taking the lead. However, coordination between EUPM and Bosnian police has been difficult, and local forces do not appear ready to take over the reins, partly because they answer to EUPM instead of to local elected officials.¹³² In fact, the 2009 EU progress report on Bosnia negatively assessed the implementation of its 2006-2009 strategy to combat organized crime, stating that institutional fragmentation of the Bosnian police and the lack of a common threat assessment or joint strategic planning remain major obstacles, as do

¹²⁸ Schroeder and Friesendorf, "State-building and organized crime," 148–150.

¹²⁹ Friesendorf and Susan E. Penska, "Militarized Law Enforcement and Peace Operations," 681.

¹³⁰ Schroeder and Friesendorf, "State-building and organized crime," 150.

¹³¹ Friesendorf and Susan E. Penska, "Militarized Law Enforcement and Peace Operations," 681.

¹³² Schroeder and Friesendorf, "State-building and organized crime," 151.

inadequate exchanges of operational data and implementation of joint action. More determination is needed and sustained efforts to harmonize legislation and increase cooperation throughout the country is necessary.¹³³

D. EVALUATION

This case study has shown that organized crime can be a powerful impediment to establishing the sustainable economy and rule of law critical to attaining stabilization and reconstruction objectives. Therefore, it is important to evaluate how effective the peace operation's counter-crime efforts in Bosnia have been at promoting these two end states using the the conditions set forth in *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. The conditions for attaining a sustainable economy include macroeconomic stabilization, market economy sustainability, employment generation, and control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to peace. The conditions for establishing the rule of law are accountability to the law, a culture of lawfulness, a just legal framework, access to justice, and public order.¹³⁴

The peace operation's confrontation with organized crime has had an impact on all four conditions necessary for Bosnia to attain a sustainable economy. From a macroeconomic stabilization standpoint, the presence of a large stabilization and reconstruction mission was beneficial in that it helped create a more stable and secure environment for economic development. Although the initial lack of focus on combating organized crime allowed criminal elements to take advantage of this stability to expand their operations and undermine macroeconomic development, over time strengthened law enforcement efforts weakened organized crime's influence on Bosnia's economy. The development of a sustainable market economy was also initially undermined by the post-conflict expansion of illicit business, but more effective counter-crime efforts, especially under EUFOR, have helped gradually shift the economy from black to gray and potentially legal markets. Likewise, the initial growth of organized crime correlated to

¹³³ Commission of the European Communities. "Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 Progress Report," http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/ba_rapport_2009_en.pdf

¹³⁴ United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 63, 131.

employment generation in illegal activities such as smuggling and prostitution, partly to meet the demands of the large peacekeeping contingent. However, as law enforcement intensified and the size of the peacekeeping force was reduced, this workforce transitioned to more legitimate forms of employment.

The conflict between peace operations and organized crime had its primary economic impact on the control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to peace. The relations forged during the war between criminal groups and Bosnian government officials, especially ultra-nationalists, corrupt politicians and the secret police, were a major impediment to gaining legitimate control over the illicit economy and economic threats to peace. Furthermore, the initial lack of effort to confront criminal activity meant that war profiteers were free to use their earnings to strengthen their illegal criminal networks and pay off local police, politicians, and media to undermine any attempts to counter crime and promote sustainable peace. However, the peacekeepers gradually began to turn the tide due to stronger counter-crime measures and the introduction of MSUs in 1999, and by 2008 EUFOR believed it had criminal economic activity largely under control. Still, there are recent indications that efforts to eliminate the post-conflict illicit economy have simply forced criminal networks to transition to white collar crime, which although less violent, could still pose a serious threat to Bosnia's economic recovery.

The peace operation's approach to dealing with organized crime also impacted efforts to promote the rule of law in Bosnia. The mission's initial lack of focus on law enforcement meant that criminal networks and corrupt officials with criminal ties could continue their illicit activities with no accountability to the law. These networks became so entrenched in Bosnian society and politics that OHR and SFOR attempts to rein in organized crime in 2001 met with political revolt and violence targeting representatives of the international community. Attempts to promote a culture of lawfulness were also undermined by the pervasiveness of this criminal culture, as well as by the peacekeepers themselves, who took part in illegal activities such as prostitution. Access to justice was

not significantly promoted because counter-crime activities were rarely able to generate prosecutable evidence, and the corruption of the local judicial system would have undermined attempts to carry out fair legal proceedings.

Public order, especially its law enforcement component, is the rule of law condition most influenced by the peace operation's efforts to confront Bosnia's organized crime problem. From the outset the fragmented, centrally weak government structure established by the Dayton Accords undermined law enforcement and crime fighting efforts by leading to overlapping legal jurisdiction and a lack of cooperation between law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, the OHR's initially weak mandate prevented it from effectively coordinating law enforcement operations between international and local police forces. The IPTF's limited mandate and IFOR's hesitancy to support law enforcement missions further hindered the fight against organized crime. However, the late 1990s saw a positive turning point in the promotion of public order with the introduction of MSUs and increased support from SFOR. The transition to EUFOR and EUPM further enhanced law enforcement capabilities by improving civilian-military cooperation, thereby reducing violent crime to levels below those in many Western European countries. Even so, efforts to improve coordination with state authorities and transition responsibility to local police forces have proven challenging, primarily due to a weak central government and inadequate law enforcement institutions. This continues to undermine counter-crime efforts and the sustainability of public order and the rule of law.

Based on this analysis, the peace operations' counter-crime efforts have had a varied impact on Bosnia's economy and rule of law. The initial lack of focus on combating organized crime allowed illicit businesses to expand their operations and challenge efforts to legalize Bosnia's economy. However, as crime-fighting capabilities improved the peace mission helped facilitate the transition to a legal, sustainable economy. The peace operation's slow start in confronting organized crime also reinforced a post-conflict culture of lawlessness and public disorder that undermined efforts to improve the rule of law. This issue was eventually addressed once law enforcement capabilities were bolstered. However, counter-crime efforts continue to face significant challenges stemming from the entrenchment of criminal networks during the

war. Based on this conclusion, addressing the issues that undermine a state's rule of law and sustainable economy during peace may be the best way to prevent organized crime from establishing a foothold that it can then exploit during war. Conversely, a preventive approach can help prevent the outbreak of violent conflict altogether, as the next chapter on the UN's preventive deployment to Macedonia demonstrates.

V. UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT TO MACEDONIA

Although much of the literature on peace operations states that preventing violent conflict is easier and less costly than attempting to resolve and recover from conflict once it has begun, minimal attention is paid to evaluating examples of preventive operations. This chapter studies the first, and so far only, example of a UN preventive deployment, UNPROFOR Macedonia, redesignated UNPREDEP in 1995. The purpose of this case study is to determine whether UNPREDEP was successful at preventing violence from spreading into Macedonia and whether such deployments are in fact a less expensive and more effective alternative to peace operations carried out after violence has erupted. The effectiveness of this operation will be further evaluated by analyzing its ability to promote the end states of a safe and secure environment and stable governance as defined in *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*,¹³⁵ which are critical to the long-term success of a preventive deployment in establishing sustainable stability and security.

A. BACKGROUND

Like its neighbors to the north, Macedonia was caught up in the wave of post-Cold War secession in Yugoslavia and in September 1991, Skopje declared its independence from Belgrade. But why would Macedonia, the weakest of the Yugoslav republics, declare independence and risk invoking a war with Serbia that it could not hope to win? Serbian President Milosevic had encouraged Macedonia to not seek independence and the Serbian government even issued a formal appeal to Skopje to not secede, a position also favored by Greece, a regional power in the southern Balkans. However, Macedonia realized that it did not want to remain a part of a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia without a Croatian or Slovenian counterbalance and went ahead with secession after a referendum for independence was passed on September 8, 1991. For

¹³⁵ United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 37, 97.

territorial and/or ethnic reasons its neighbors were less than enthusiastic about Skopje's declaration, especially Greece and Serbia, who reacted with open hostility. The resulting lack of international recognition, economic embargoes, and isolation complicated Macedonia's transition to an independent state, destabilizing an already vulnerable nation and promoting internal ethnic tensions.¹³⁶

Adding to Macedonia's problems was the fact that all the other newly independent former-Yugoslav states had engaged in some form of violent conflict. With Croatia and Bosnia embroiled in major wars, there was a widespread belief that it was just a matter of time before war spread to Macedonia. Like Croatia, Macedonia had a large minority group (Albanian) primarily concentrated in one geographic region and extremist Albanians had even proclaimed their own independent "republic."¹³⁷ Furthermore, the southeastern Balkans, including Macedonia, had the least developed economies in the former Yugoslavia because they were at a greater distance from the industrial centers in Central and Western Europe. The Albanian communities in Kosovo and Macedonia were the poorest of all, and not surprisingly, showed the highest level of intolerance and ethnic tension.¹³⁸

A conflict over Macedonia could have expanded from a regional to an international war involving not only the former Yugoslavia, but also all of Macedonia's neighbors, and the involvement of Greece could have drawn in Turkey. A conflict involving Greece and Turkey, whose relations had been steadily worsening since the division of Cyprus in 1974, was a serious concern for the international community. Greece has had a longstanding political dispute with Macedonia and strong political and cultural links with Serbia (Milosevic's family owned property in the Greek Islands). Turkey naturally felt more sympathetic towards the Muslim population in the Balkans, including the Albanian minority in Macedonia, which they believed was being persecuted

¹³⁶ Brad K. Blitz, *War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 111–113.

¹³⁷ Alice Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 101.

¹³⁸ Gibbs, *First Do No Harm*, 52, 58–59.

by Orthodox Christians. These fundamental differences in interpreting the situation in the Balkans could have sparked the first war between NATO allies, a development that could have jeopardized the future of the alliance and sparked a global crisis.¹³⁹

However, Milosevic did not actively oppose Skopje's declaration of independence because he was not overly concerned about Macedonia's small Serbian minority of about 40,000, despite the fact that the Serbian Orthodox Church classified Macedonians as "South Serbs." Greece's objection was primarily over the use of the name Macedonia, which it interpreted as a potential claim to its northern Macedonian region, formerly the southern portion of a greater Macedonia. However, this was not reason enough to begin a military conflict, especially since, considering the circumstances in the region, it was in Athens' best interests to have a stable neighbor on its northern border. Albania ultimately welcomed Macedonia's independence because it saw it "as a counterweight to Serbia and an irritant to Greece," and Bulgaria did not want to jeopardize its fragile stability and efforts to join European institutions.¹⁴⁰

Nevertheless, the Balkans were a volatile region and a peaceful secession did not guarantee the young nation a secure future. Macedonia still had to deal with less than friendly more powerful neighbors, no real military capability, an unstable economy, tense ethnic relations, and a political system in transition. The Yugoslav military had pulled out of Macedonia and transferred its soldiers and equipment to the Bosnian front, but that conflict would eventually draw down, allowing Serbia to direct its focus towards its southern neighbor.¹⁴¹ More importantly, ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians were on the rise across the northern border in Kosovo, drawing the attention of Albania to the West and Macedonia's own Albanian minority. Realizing his nation's tenuous position, on November 11, 1992, President Gligorov of Macedonia conveyed a request to

¹³⁹ Alastair Finlan, *The Collapse of Yugoslavia 1991–1999* (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2003), 64.

¹⁴⁰ Pond, *Endgame in the Balkans*, 170.

¹⁴¹ Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail*, 4.

UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali for the deployment of UN observers to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in view of his concern regarding the possible spread of violence from elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.¹⁴²

B. INTERVENTION

With the Security Council's approval, in late November 1992, the Secretary-General sent a team of military, police and civilian personnel to Macedonia to assess the situation on the ground and prepare a report concerning a possible deployment of UNPROFOR to that Republic. In early December, the Secretary-General submitted report S/24923 to the Security Council, in which he recommended an expansion of the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR to establish a UN presence on Macedonia's borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). He indicated that the force's mandate would fall largely under Chapter VI of the Charter of the UN and be essentially preventive, to monitor and report any developments in the border areas that could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia and threaten its territory. The Secretary-General recommended that this mission be comprised of a battalion of up to 700 all ranks, 35 UN Military Observers (UNMOs), 26 UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) monitors, 10 civil affairs staff, and 45 administrative staff and local interpreters. This contingent would operate under UNPROFOR's "Macedonia Command" with its headquarters located in Skopje.¹⁴³

On December 11, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 795 with a 15-0 vote, unanimously approving the Secretary-General's report and authorizing the establishment of UNPROFOR's presence in Macedonia. The mission was charged, by its presence, to deter "threats from any source, as well as help prevent clashes that could otherwise occur between external elements and Macedonian forces, thus helping to strengthen security and confidence in Macedonia." The military deployment's objectives would be to: "Monitor Macedonia's borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of

¹⁴² United Nations, "United Nations Preventive Deployment, Macedonia," http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_p.htm (accessed March 3, 2010).

¹⁴³ Ibid.

Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), report all activities that might increase tension or threaten peace and stability, (and) stand between forces that might otherwise clash.” It was pointed out that Macedonian authorities did not expect the UN to defend its borders. UNCIVPOL’s mandate would be to “monitor the work of the local border police. On the western border the UNCIVPOL presence would assist in calming any inter-ethnic tensions, mainly in the context of illegal border crossings.” Civil Affairs Officers would liaison between UNPROFOR and the central and local authorities, and Public Information Officers were charged with implementing an information program to ensure “the role of the United Nations presence is fully understood by the population.”¹⁴⁴

The Security Council requested that the force be deployed immediately and urged UNPROFOR Macedonia to coordinate closely with the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission, which already had a spillover monitoring mission in place in Skopje since September 1992. Due to the violence spreading throughout the Balkans at the time, the UN was perceived by many as being incapable of effectively intervening in ethnic conflicts and this was an opportunity for the Security Council to prove that it could successfully coordinate and execute a preventive, multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission.¹⁴⁵ Secretary General Boutros-Ghali told the Security Council that he envisioned a UN mission to Macedonia “as being a preventive deployment of the kind discussed in . . . *An Agenda for Peace*,”¹⁴⁶ an opportunity to test his revolutionary concept of preventive deployment as a new method of conflict prevention. The speed with which the force deployed highlighted the importance the UN placed on this mission: two civil affairs officers were on the ground in Macedonia within 24 hours of the passing of Resolution 795. A senior UNMO arrived on December 17, followed by UNCIVPOL officers on 28 December. By January 26, 1993, 500 Canadians

¹⁴⁴ United Nations, Security Council, *Report of The Secretary General of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, S/24923/1992, December 9, 1992, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/780/80/PDF/N9278080.pdf> (accessed March 3, 2010).

¹⁴⁵ Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail*, 102, 115.

¹⁴⁶ Henryk J. Sokalski, *An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 28–29.

were in country, replaced in February by a Nordic Battalion of 700 Scandinavian soldiers, which was supplemented that July by a U.S. battalion of 300 American soldiers, the first use of U.S. combat forces under UN command.¹⁴⁷

C. CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PEACE OPERATION

UNPROFOR Macedonia quickly established a presence on the ground in Macedonia, and immediately began building an organizational structure and infrastructure capable of carrying out its stated mandate. It set up fixed and temporary observation posts along Macedonia's border with Albania and Serbia, and carried out its mission through ground and air patrols. UNMOs and UNCIVPOL primarily deployed along the Albanian border, patrolling border crossings and villages. Immediately establishing good relations with the local population proved essential to carrying out the observer mission, including UNCIVPOL's contacts with the local Macedonian police and their monitoring of the treatment of individuals in custody. Since Serbia and Macedonia were still negotiating a border dispute, one of the primary missions of the peacekeeping troops was monitoring the UN-established administrative line (interim border). Since the border was not clearly marked, peacekeepers mostly dealt with minor, accidental incursions, which were usually resolved by simply informing the perpetrators that they were on the wrong side of the border. The peacekeepers generally dealt with more crime-related activities along the Albanian border, such as cross-border smuggling and illegal border crossings.¹⁴⁸

However, it soon became clear that the threat to Macedonia's security and stability came less from external aggression than internal issues, such as an ineffective government, rampant corruption, a weak economy, and interethnic conflict. The mission realized that in order to carry out its broader objectives it would need to address these issues, but its initial mandate did not provide it the authority to do so. The Special Representative of the SRSG brought this to the attention of the Secretary-General, and in

¹⁴⁷ Sokalski, *An Ounce of Prevention*, 99.

¹⁴⁸ Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail*, 119–120.

March 1994 Security Council Resolution 908 was passed, encouraging “the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia, in cooperation with the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to use his good offices as appropriate to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in that Republic.”¹⁴⁹ Authorizing the SRSG to use his good offices significantly expanded his capabilities, allowing him to monitor political, economic, and social conditions and engage Macedonian leaders in times of crisis, often in coordination with the local OSCE mission. For example, in October 1994, the SRSG monitored the presidential and parliamentary elections in coordination with the OSCE, EU, Council of Europe and several NGOs. One of his major accomplishments was convincing the competing parties to avoid ethnic tensions by promising to abide by democratic norms and avoid harsh nationalist language.¹⁵⁰

In 1995, Croatia and Macedonia approached the Secretary-General with the request that the UN forces in their countries be separated from UNPROFOR, which they believed was fully engaged in a mission in Bosnia that no longer resembled their unique situations. The Secretary-General subsequently presented report S/1995/222 to the Security Council, proposing to replace UNPROFOR with three separate but interlinked peacekeeping operations, each with its own military commander and headed by a civilian Chief of Mission. In view of the “interlinked nature of the problems in the areas,” overall command and control would be exercised by the SRSG and a Theatre Force Commander headquartered at the UN Peace Forces headquarters (UNPF-HQ) in Zagreb. He recommended converting UNPROFOR in Macedonia into UNPF-3 “with the same responsibilities and composition,” and the transfer of “all relevant Security Council resolutions and authorities.”¹⁵¹ On 31 March 1995, the Security Council passed

¹⁴⁹ United Nations, Security Council, *Resolution 908 (1994)*, S/RES/908 (1994), March 31, 1994, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/161/07/PDF/N9416107.pdf> (accessed March 3, 2010).

¹⁵⁰ Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail*, 120–121.

¹⁵¹ United Nations, Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 947 (1994)*, S/1995/222, March 22, 1995, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/083/60/IMG/N9508360.pdf>, (accessed March 3, 2010).

Resolution 983, which declared that UNPROFOR Macedonia would henceforth be known as UNPREDEP, with the mandate set out in the Secretary-General's report mentioned above. On February 1, 1996, with the termination of UNPF-HQ's mandate, UNPREDEP became an independent mission reporting directly to UN headquarters in New York, further acknowledging the unique nature of UNPREDEP's preventive operation.¹⁵²

As the threat to Macedonia's territorial integrity further decreased, UNPREDEP found itself playing even more of a political role focused on addressing potentially destabilizing internal issues. Macedonia's economy, never a model for success, had been further weakened by political and ethnic tensions, a Greek embargo, and international sanctions against Yugoslavia. UNPREDEP was not as successful at improving this situation as Macedonia's border issues, partly because of constraints in the mission's mandate, but primarily because there was limited international support for implementing a robust program of economic stability and reform. UNPREDEP also attempted to help address Macedonia's social issues by carrying out developmental projects, often in conjunction with other UN agencies, such as teaching a UNICEF-funded landmine detection class for Bosnian refugees and using helicopters to deliver water pipes to remote villages.¹⁵³

By mid-1997, UNPREDEP was preparing for a force reduction and an approaching end to its mandate. Although instability in Albania prolonged the mandate until November 1997 and then August 1998, during this time the mission's manpower was reduced by 300 peacekeepers. However, due to the violence in Kosovo, the mandate was again extended to February 1999, and troop levels were increased to 1,050. In mid-February, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on UNPREDEP's activities and developments in the mission area, stating that peace and stability in Macedonia continued to depend largely on developments in other parts of the region, in particular in Kosovo, and recommended extending the mandate an additional six months.

¹⁵² Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail*, 118.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 121–122.

The force's extension was likewise requested by the Macedonian government in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General, based on concern over the danger of a spill-over of the Kosovo conflict, increased tensions on the Albanian-Yugoslav border, and the lack of progress in the demarcation of the country's border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Another issue was strained relations between Macedonia and Serbia caused by Skopje's decision to authorize the deployment of a NATO Extraction Force on its territory.¹⁵⁴

However, following Skopje's formal recognition of Taiwan, Beijing vetoed an extension of UNPREDEP's mission and its mandate and mission expired on March 1, 1999. UNPREDEP has just reached its peak operations tempo, averaging some 400 patrols per week from 80 observation posts, including 300 border and community patrols and 15 helicopter patrol missions. In addition, the civilian police monitors were conducting approximately 100 patrols per week. Furthermore, it had been less than a year since Security Council Resolution 1186 had expanded its mandate to monitor and report on illicit arms flows and other prohibited activities. In addition, UNPREDEP's contingency plans for refugees had been enacted for the first time shortly before its abrupt termination, when, in a prelude of what would shortly come, approximately 400 Kosovars entered Macedonia near a UNPREDEP observation post and requested humanitarian assistance.¹⁵⁵

D. IMPACT OF THE MISSION

UNPREDEP demonstrated that a flexible, multi-dimensional approach to preventive deployment can be effective and is an example of conflict prevention where actions by both internal and external actors worked together to prevent a potential clash and in effect establish an international guarantee on a nation's territorial integrity. The force's mandate was expanded several times to meet the mission's evolving requirements and the mix of military deployments, good offices, and humanitarian development proved

¹⁵⁴ Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail*, 128.

¹⁵⁵ Sokalski, *An Ounce of Prevention*, 264.

to be operationally effective.¹⁵⁶ The high level of capability and professionalism of the Scandinavian and American soldiers also contributed to the force's effectiveness.¹⁵⁷ As the Secretary-General stated in a report on UNPREDEP to the Security Council: "UNPREDEP has demonstrated that preventive deployment can work where there is political will, a clear mandate and purpose, and the necessary commitment on the part of all parties concerned."¹⁵⁸ These factors allowed UNPREDEP to effectively carry out its primary mission to prevent violent conflict and deter, by its presence, any threats to Macedonia's peace and stability, thereby ensuring Macedonia was the only former Yugoslav republic to secede peacefully.

In addition, UNPREDEP effectively coordinated and integrated the functions of numerous regional and international players into a cohesive peace operation, including the OSCE, Council of Europe, EU, NATO, several UN organizations, and NGOs. This illustrates that, provided the appropriate mandate, a UN force can step up and convincingly lead a multifaceted regional peacekeeping mission. Furthermore, UNPREDEP showed that timely preventive action can be a far less costly approach to international intervention. The UN mission in Macedonia lasted approximately six years with an average annual budget of \$55 million, bringing the total cost to \$330 million. In contrast, an intermediate-level, two-year conflict has been estimated to cost on average \$15 billion, while a large regional conflict involving several countries can cost as much as \$144 billion. These figures do not account for the massive human costs of war, which UNPREDEP's efforts also helped prevent.¹⁵⁹

UNPREDEP's stabilizing influence also gave Macedonia an opportunity to address issues critical to its long-term stability, including building better relations with

¹⁵⁶ Sokalski, *An Ounce of Prevention*, 218.

¹⁵⁷ Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail*, 129.

¹⁵⁸ United Nations, Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1027 (1995)*, S/1996/65, January 30, 1996, <http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u960130a.htm> (accessed March 3, 2010).

¹⁵⁹ Sokalski, *An Ounce of Prevention*, 216, 218.

neighboring countries and stronger ties to the international community.¹⁶⁰ In 1993, the naming dispute with Greece was temporarily resolved when Macedonia agreed to use the provisional name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. That same year, Macedonia was admitted to the UN under its provisional name and, within a few years, Greece would become Macedonia’s biggest investor. This opened the door for Macedonian membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the nation receiving the democratic certificate of membership in the Council of Europe. Skopje began receiving financial assistance from the EU in 1992. That amount increased substantially starting in 1996, with the implementation of the EU’s Phare program for the development of democracy and a free-market system. The young state also attained the formal recognition of all its neighbors with the signing of an interim accord with Greece in September 1995, and establishment of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in early 1996.¹⁶¹

UNPREDEP’s attempts to address Macedonia’s social and economic issues had more limited results, partly because the force was never formally mandated to perform this mission or manned or resourced for such efforts. Although the mission’s modest successes in these areas did help promote security and stability, it could have made better progress if the international community had more effectively supplemented the preventive deployment with economic assistance.¹⁶² Furthermore, per Henryk Sokalski, the civilian head of UNPREDEP from 1995 to 1998, his mission should have been better funded to perform confidence-building humanitarian and developmental projects. Force commanders often could not help villages that had requested assistance with building roads for basic transportation, pipelines for running water, wiring for electricity, or spare parts for pumps and generators.¹⁶³ These projects could have generated significant goodwill and trust from the local population, more than making up for their modest costs.

¹⁶⁰ Sokalski, *An Ounce of Prevention*, 217.

¹⁶¹ Pond, *Endgame in the Balkans*, 170.

¹⁶² Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail*, 129.

¹⁶³ Sokalski, *An Ounce of Prevention*, 221.

Ultimately though, the mission's potential impact was cut short by China's February 1999 veto of the Security Council resolution to extend UNPREDEP's mandate. Beijing's position was that it had always maintained that UN peacekeeping operations, including preventive deployment missions, should not be open-ended. Since the situation in Macedonia had stabilized and its relations with neighboring countries had improved, a UN peacekeeping force was no longer required. Others believe Beijing's true motive was retribution for Macedonia's recent diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.¹⁶⁴ Whatever the reason, the sudden termination of UNPREDEP's mission prematurely halted its productive work, stalling Macedonia's development and leaving it vulnerable to rising ethnic tensions, both internally and along its northern border.

Macedonia would face several significant threats to its security and stability shortly after the departure of UNPREDEP. Throughout the late 1990s, ethnic tension and violence had been escalating between Kosovo's Albanians and Serbs, leading to military involvement from Serbia and subsequently a NATO air campaign from March to June 1999, against Serbia and Serb military targets in Kosovo. These developments added to the ethnic divide within Macedonia, with Albanians supporting their Kosovar counterparts and NATO's military action and Macedonians generally supporting the Serbs and opposing NATO's campaign. They also caused the sudden influx of 350,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees, equal to nearly one fifth of Macedonia's population, further straining the nation's fragile stability. Another significant test was a 2001 insurgency by the extremist nationalist Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA), which threatened to escalate to a major violent conflict. However, once more Macedonia averted war through political cooperation and international support, with Macedonian and Albanian parties signing the Ohrid Agreement in August 2001, giving more rights to the minority Albanians through constitutional amendments, providing more power to local

¹⁶⁴ New York University School of Law, "Constitutional Watch: Macedonia," *East European Constitutional Review* 10, no. 2/3 (Spring/Summer 2001), http://www1.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol10num2_3/constitutionwatch/macedonia.html, (accessed March 1, 2010).

governments, and allowing the use of the Albanian language in state institutions.¹⁶⁵ Another test came in February 2004, when Macedonian President Trajkovski was killed in a plane crash and riots broke out across the border in Kosovo two weeks later, but yet again stability held.¹⁶⁶

E. EVALUATION

This section further evaluates UNPREDEP's performance through its ability to advance the conditions necessary to attaining the end states of establishing a safe and secure environment and stable governance as described in *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*,¹⁶⁷ since these end states are critical to promoting the stability and security of a nation vulnerable to violent conflict. The conditions for achieving a safe and secure environment include territorial security, physical security, public order, the cessation of large-scale violence, and a legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence. The conditions necessary for establishing stable governance are the provision of essential services, political moderation and accountability, stewardship of state resources, and civic participation and empowerment.

Ensuring Macedonia's territorial security was UNPREDEP's primary mission under its mandate and it fulfilled this objective by in effect establishing an international guarantee on Macedonia's territorial integrity. The operation's regular patrols along the borders with Albania and Serbia ensured incursions were resolved peacefully and did not escalate, particularly along the UN Administrative Line with Serbia. This mission was especially important during the instability in Albania and Kosovo in the late 1990s, which could have easily spilled over into Macedonia. However, UNPREDEP's efforts to help resolve the Macedonian-Serbian border dispute were not effective, and this issue flared up when NATO stationed an extraction force on Macedonian territory during its Kosovo

¹⁶⁵ Oliver Ramsbotham et al, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Malden: Polity Press, 2005), 128.

¹⁶⁶ Pond, *Endgame in the Balkans*, 182.

¹⁶⁷ United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 37, 97.

campaign. From a physical security standpoint, the mission helped protect the first group of Kosovar refugees that crossed into Macedonia in 1999 seeking humanitarian assistance.

UNPREDEP and UNCIVPOL promoted public order from a law enforcement standpoint by working with the local Macedonian police to prevent criminal activities along the border with Albania and monitoring their treatment of individuals in custody. UNPREDEP was becoming more involved in law enforcement after its mission was expanded to include monitoring and reporting on illicit arms flows and other crimes, but the sudden termination of its mandate prevented further progress. Although UNPREDEP did not have to deal with large-scale violence, the stabilizing impact of its presence and operations may have prevented the outbreak of violence along Macedonia's borders. Furthermore, the swift political resolution of the 2001 NLA insurgency may not have been possible without UNPREDEP's preceding stabilization and reform efforts. This incident also indicated that the mission's support of the Macedonian government had facilitated state efforts to gain a fairly strong monopoly over means of organized violence.

UNPREDEP was able to effectively promote stable governance in Macedonia once its mandate was expanded in 1994 to allow the SRSG to use his "good offices" to maintain peace and stability and strengthen the government. The operation supported the provision of essential services through its modest developmental projects, although it could have accomplished more if it were better funded in this area. The SRSG's monitoring of the 1994 elections furthered political moderation and accountability by promoting democratic norms and reducing the level of antagonistic nationalist language. UNPREDEP's security assistance allowed the Macedonian government to focus its limited state resources towards developing civil society and reforming the security sector. These reforms subsequently promoted Macedonia's civic participation and empowerment by facilitating a peace agreement to the 2001 NLA insurgency that gave ethnic Albanians more political rights and distributed more power to local governments.

This evaluation demonstrate that a timely, well organized preventive deployment with an appropriate mandate and support from the international community and host-nation can be largely effective at helping establishing a safe and secure environment and stable governance. Although UNPREDEP's mission was cut short by the premature termination of its mandate, its peace operations and developmental efforts had a positive long-term impact on Macedonia's ability to effectively govern itself, promote internal stability, and secure its borders.

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VI. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis researched three elements of peace operations in the former Yugoslavia, which, although generally considered important to their success, have not received sufficient attention in current literature on peace missions in the Balkans. These elements include the Dayton Accords' impact on promoting Bosnia's social well-being, the ability of peace operations to deal with organized crime in Bosnia, and the long-term effectiveness of the UNPREDEP mission to Macedonia. These factors were evaluated using the Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction¹⁶⁸ and a broader analysis based on an operation's ability to accomplish its assigned mission and promote the development of its host nation. This concluding section reviews and compares the findings of this study to better understand the long-term impact of these missions, identify any recurring themes and lessons, and determine if any of them have been applied in doctrine or practice.

The social well-being case study concludes that the Dayton Accords and associated peace operations were successful at quickly reestablishing basic services post-conflict and promoting freedom of movement for the return of displaced persons. However, these efforts have been hampered in the long-run by the weak central government and largely independent entities established by the Accords, leading to fragmented state institutions. This means that the state has not been able to enforce measures intended to promote the nation's social well-being and implement social reforms necessary for full integration into the European and international communities. Most children do not have access to standardized, quality, ethnically diverse education and the situation is getting worse. The division of institutions and services between entities undermines the return of displaced persons, as does violence and discrimination faced by ethnic minorities. Furthermore, minorities, the disabled, and the displaced all

¹⁶⁸ United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 8.

have difficulties accessing adequate basic needs and services. Although the Bosnian government should be resolving these issues, it is too divided and dependent on the international community to make any headway.

These issues indicate that Bosnia is not yet ready to take responsibility for its social well-being. The lack of progress in establishing a strong central government and state institutions continues to undermine efforts to improve social dialogue and relations between ethnic groups, encouraging further segregation, the rise of nationalist ethnic parties, and political undermining of war crimes prosecution. It also undercuts efforts to address these issues by thwarting the adoption of legislation to further Bosnia's social-well being. This include laws to ensure minority rights and representation at all levels of government and provide universal, ethnically sensitive education. Fifteen years on, the flaws of the Dayton Accords continue to undermine Bosnia's social well-being and prevent a final resolution to the conflict that devastated the nation with war. They also prevent it from reducing its dependence on the international community and making progress towards becoming a truly stable, sovereign state. Ultimately, there can be no sustainable peace until the conditions for ensuring a population's social well-being are met, but as of today, Bosnia is not capable of making the progress necessary to achieve that goal in the foreseeable future.

The organized crime case study demonstrates that peace operations and criminal networks tend to have a complicated relationship: tolerating, cooperating with, or attempting to impede each other's operations based on what position best promotes their interests and objectives. During wartime, peace operations are focused on protecting and supporting the civilian population and containing and stopping the conflict, all while operating in an inhospitable environment. Their focus is not on combating organized crime and, as the Bihac example illustrates, they may tolerate or even cooperate with illicit activities that support attaining their objectives. However, such alliances of opportunity generally begin to break down post-conflict, when peace operations turn their focus toward stabilization and reconstruction.

Efforts to confront organized crime in post-conflict Bosnia started slow, but improved as the mission progressed. The peace operation's early lack of focus on law enforcement, the initial weakness of the OHR, and IFOR's unwillingness to engage in nontraditional operations allowed criminal networks to flourish nearly unimpeded. Over time an empowered High Representative, better civilian-military cooperation, and the introduction of military constabulary forces began to subdue violent crime. However, as in the case of promoting social well-being, a long term, sustainable solution to the problem is undermined by a weak state government with inadequate institutions unable to take responsibility for policing its territory.

The impact of the peace operations' counter-crime efforts on promoting Bosnia's economy and rule of law have been mixed. From an economic standpoint, the initial lack of focus on combating organized crime gave illicit businesses the opportunity to expand their operations and undermine efforts to legalize Bosnia's economy. However, as efforts to fight organized crime improved the peace operation facilitated the ongoing transition to a legal, sustainable economy. Similarly, the peace operation's slow start in confronting organized crime hurt efforts to improve the rule of law by allowing a post-conflict culture of lawlessness and public disorder and only turned this around once its law enforcement capabilities were bolstered. Although counter-crime efforts were eventually able to promote Bosnia's economy and rule of law, they still face significant challenges, in large part due to the entrenchment of criminal networks during the war. From this standpoint the best strategy may be a preventive one. Addressing the issues that undermine a state's rule of law and sustainable economy during peace can help prevent organized crime from establishing a foothold that it can then exploit during war. As the UN's preventive deployment to Macedonia demonstrates, a preventive approach can help prevent the outbreak of violent conflict altogether.

In the case of UNPREDEP, although there was significant ethnic tension between the Slavic Macedonian majority and Albanian minority, they were not enflamed by the atrocities of war. Furthermore, although Macedonia's state institutions required strengthening and post-communist reforms, they did not have to be rebuilt from scratch, and they answered to a centralized, legitimate state government supportive of a peace

operation it had requested. These factors facilitated efforts to promote a safe and secure environment and stable governance. Moreover, since the peace operation did not have to take responsibility for administering Macedonia, there was little risk of the local government becoming dependent on the international community. Therefore, the peace operation could withdraw without undermining the internal stability and security of the nation. This also meant that the peace operation's manpower and resourcing requirements were proportionately significantly less than those demanded in Bosnia.

Despite this overall positive evaluation, it would be difficult to prove that UNPREDEP's efforts were responsible for Macedonia overcoming numerous threats to its stability without reverting to violent conflict. Furthermore, it is unclear if Macedonia has continued its slow but steady development because UNPREDEP was able to help lay a solid foundation of stability and security or in spite of its premature and jarring departure. However, UNPREDEP did demonstrate that a timely, well-organized preventive deployment with an appropriate mandate and support from the international community and host-nation can be effective at helping promote stability and security, even if ultimate responsibility lies with the host nation and its government. And yet, despite its apparent successes, UNPREDEP is still the only example of a UN preventive deployment. The UN may be well served to compare the costs and benefits of engaging in conflict preemption versus conflict reconciliation. The post-Cold War examples in the Balkans may persuade the international community that it is in its own best interests to devote more of its energy to the former.

Based on these case studies, several recurring themes emerge. All the cases demonstrated a need for effective cooperation between civilian and military counterparts. The military must be willing and able to engage in aspects of peace operations outside the traditional military mission, such as law enforcement and nation building. It appears this lesson is being integrated into U.S. military doctrine. In November 2005, DoD released *Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, stating that stability operations will be a core U.S. military mission the DoD will be prepared to conduct and support. The directive stresses that these operations will be integrated across all DoD activities and given priority

comparable to combat operations. These SSTR operations are likely to be more important to the lasting success of military operations than traditional combat operations alone.¹⁶⁹ *Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations*, released in October 2008, states that America's future overseas engagements will primarily be multilateral efforts to defeat insurgencies, assist fragile states, and provide humanitarian aid. Therefore, the U.S. military will have to strengthen its ability to generate "soft" power and often play a supporting role to the civilian agencies in charge of these complex missions.¹⁷⁰

Another conclusion from this thesis is that although post-conflict peace operations can help promote stability and reconstruction, it is much more difficult to help establish the unified, legitimate central government and capable institutions that allow the state to become fully sovereign. In Bosnia, American and international nation-building efforts have largely had the opposite effect, making the local government dependent on their assistance. The unintended consequence is the international community cannot depart without undermining the nation's stability. This underscores the need to ensure Bosnian institutions are capable of effectively running the state before completely handing the reins back to the government in Sarajevo. UNPREDEP's efforts in Macedonia have proven more effective in the long-term because they were undertaken before the outbreak of a major violent conflict, which meant the peacekeepers had an existing legitimate government and institutions with which to work. This underscores the importance and benefit of taking preventive measures to address potential sources of conflict before they lead to war.

Comparing the results of the Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction¹⁷¹ evaluations provides additional conclusions. The assessment of the Dayton Accords' impact on Bosnia's social well-being concluded that the peace

¹⁶⁹ Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, November 28, 2005, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/cdie/sss06/sss_1_080106_dod.pdf (accessed March 12, 2010).

¹⁷⁰ United States Army, *Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), Foreword, vi–vii, 5–4, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf> (accessed March 12, 2010),

¹⁷¹ United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 8.

operations effectively reestablished basic services and promoted freedom of movement for the return of displaced persons. However, they were unable to promote long-term reforms in education, protection and care for vulnerable groups, full reintegration of displaced persons, and social reconstruction between ethnic groups. The primary cause of these failures was the ineffectiveness of the weak central government and institutions established by the Accords themselves. The Bosnian peace operation's counter-crime efforts have had mixed results in promoting a sustainable economy and the rule of law. An initial lack of focus on crime fighting allowed organized crime to flourish and undermine reforms, but gradual improvements in law enforcement weakened criminal networks and facilitated the transition to a legal economy and rule of law. However, efforts to turn over responsibility to local authorities have been undermined by weak law enforcement institutions. UNPREDEP has had better long-term results in promoting a safe and secure environment and stable governance in Macedonia. The primary reason is that the nation had not been devastated by war and there was a viable state government that the peace operation could partner with and work to strengthen.

In summary, comparing the results from the three cases in this thesis point to several key conclusions. The peace operations in Bosnia, supported by a strengthened OHR and improved civil-military cooperation, have promoted some aspects of social well-being, reduced the level of violent organized crime, and prevented a recurrence of violent conflict. However, their inability to establish a truly unified nation with a strong central government and effective state institutions has undermined Bosnia's long-term development and led to dependency on the international community. UNPREDEP, on the other hand, was able to prevent the spread of violence and promote stable governance in Macedonia at far lower cost and without undermining the state's independence. The fact that Macedonia is a sovereign nation making steady progress towards full European integration while Bosnia remains a largely divided nation under international supervision further highlights the benefits of addressing potential causes of conflict before they lead to war. It appears, however, that the U.S. and the international community have not heeded this lesson, since to this day UNPREDEP remains the sole case of a preventive deployment.

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